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COUNTRIES' POLITICS PLAY ROLE IN NORDIC NWF-ZONE

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 6 Jun 81 p 15

[Article by Harald Hamrin: "Nordic Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone -- 'Nothing But Politics'"]

[Text] The old debate about a nuclear weapons-free [NWF] zone in the Nordic countries has flared up again in all of the Nordic countries. A popular campaign is under way for an NWF-zone in the Nordic countries. There are several different proposals, but all of them are regarded as unrealistic for various reasons. Nevertheless, there is a steady stream of political initiatives. For tactical reasons, some say. In order to capture the genuine concern of the people, say others.

The old debate about the establishment of an NWF-zone in the Nordic countries has recently been revived. Among politicians, in diplomatic circles, in the growing peace movement and in the press various proposals for a "non-nuclear weapons reserve" in northern Europe or parts thereof are being discussed.

During the past week alone there has been a steady stream of news. Last weekend the Nordic prime ministers met at Harpsund, and among the topics discussed was the issue of a Nordic NWF-zone.

The issue reappeared last Monday in connection with the visit of Norway's Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland to Helsinki. And last Wednesday the Stockholm Parliament debated the opportunities of establishing an NWF-zone.

There are divided opinions as to the reason for this activity. Growing concern that the Nordic countries will be exposed to all the horrors of a nuclear war, some say. Artificial resuscitation, maintain others. Playing with party tactics, says a third group.

But the debate is under way and likely to continue -- if only in connection with the campaign for a Nordic NWF-area initiated by a number of peace and women's organizations in the Nordic countries.

Seen in a somewhat larger time frame, however, the ongoing debate is nothing new. On and off during the last 25 years a number of plans, thoughts and ideas -- more or

less ambitious, more or less realistic -- have been brought up concerning a reserve free of nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries.

Rapacki Plan

Toward the end of the 1950's the so-called Rapacki Plan, named after the Polish foreign minister at that time, was presented. The nucleus of the plan was a ban on nuclear weapons in both of the German states, Poland and Czechoslovakia. During the debate around the Rapacki Plan various proposals were brought up concerning expansion of the NWF-area to include the Nordic countries and Italy. The plan failed on account of opposition in the West, where its actual purpose was viewed as preventing the stationing of U.S. nuclear weapons in West Germany in order to counterbalance the large conventional force superiority of the East.

A few years later, in 1961, the so-called Unden Plan appeared, named for Foreign Minister Osten Unden. The Unden Plan had a more global aim. In a speech to the UN in New York the Swedish foreign minister proposed the establishment of a "nuclear weapons-free club," consisting, hopefully, of all the nations which at that time did not themselves possess nuclear weapons. The concept of "nuclear weapons-free zones" in for example Africa, Latin America, Australia and the Nordic countries was also brought up.

Two years later, in 1963, Finland's President Urho Kekkonen presented his so-called Kekkonen Plan, which since then has been dusted off time and again, most recently in a speech at the Foreign Policy Institute in Stockholm in 1978. According to the original Kekkonen Plan, the Nordic countries and their territorial waters should form a nuclear weapons-free zone. In his speech in Stockholm in 1978 Kekkonen proposed that potential negotiations for a Nordic zone could be tied to the SALT negotiations about strategic nuclear weapons or other negotiations about nuclear weapons in Europe.

In 1980 Alva Myrdal proposed in the Social Democratic publication TIDEN and in the DAGENS NYHETER that Finland and Sweden should lead the way for the establishment of an NWF-area in the Nordic countries. But she protested when some people branded her proposal a "mini-zone."

That brings us to today's debate, the beginning of which dates back to the end of 1979. It was at that time that NATO at a meeting in Brussels made the so-called double decision to modernize the U.S. nuclear weapons in Western Europe (intermediate-range missiles of the Pershing 2 type and cruise missiles) and at the same time to negotiate with the Soviet Union for a nuclear arms limitation.

Protest

The "double decision" gave rise to a protest movement in several Western European nations, a protest movement which since then has grown in intensity. In the Nordic countries this movement became particularly strong in Norway, where, among other things, it gained political foothold in the left wing of the ruling Labor Party.

It was also in Norway that some new formulations and thoughts grew up, which subsequently have gained a considerable following both in Sweden and Denmark. Johan

Jorgen Holst, state secretary in the Norwegian Defense Department, stated that the debate about nuclear weapons in Northern Europe could not be limited to the Nordic countries. These are in practice already free of nuclear weapons -- at least in peacetime -- and by their signing the so-called non-proliferation agreement have pledged not to acquire their own nuclear weapons in the future.

Holst was therefore of the opinion that a meaningful discussion about nuclear weapons in the Nordic countries must include in the calculations those nuclear weapons which to be sure are based outside the Nordic countries but which due to their relatively short range can primarily be assumed to be intended for targets within the Nordic countries. He introduced the concept of "thinning-out zone" and pointed directly to the Leningrad military district (including the Kola Peninsula) in the Soviet Union, where today there are nuclear weapons of this kind.

Furthermore, a similar concept had been brought up as early as 1975 by the then state secretary in the Swedish Defense Ministry Anders Thunborg. Unlike Holst, however, Thunborg had pointed out the existence of nuclear weapons which ought to be removed not only east but south and west of Sweden as well -- that is to say both in the Soviet Union and on the NATO side.

Norway

In the Norwegian debate a phrase developed at the beginning of this year, which has since come to express the official Norwegian government position, according to which the efforts ought to be directed toward the establishment of "an NWF-zone in the Nordic area as part of the task of gradually reducing the nuclear weapons in a greater European context."

The phrase is again found in the platform of the Norwegian Labor Party and is repeated almost verbatim in a declaration accepted at the meeting of the Nordic Social Democratic parties and union organizations in Bommersvik in mid-May:

"The Nordic countries should find out what the existing joint basis is on the subject of an NWF-zone in the Nordic countries as a link in the work for nuclear disarmament in a greater European context."

Statements such as these have attracted attention and caused concern in several NATO capitals. As early as the beginning of this year highly placed representatives of the governments in Bonn, London and Washington made inquiries in Oslo.

"What are you really up to?" was the essence of the diplomatic thrusts, which expressed concern that Norway (and Denmark) were slipping away from the nuclear cooperation in the NATO framework. (To be sure, Norway and Denmark do not permit the stationing of nuclear weapons in peacetime on their respective territories, but in other respects they concur with the joint NATO nuclear weapons strategy.)

The concern in NATO circles, particularly great in the Reagan administration, seemed to subside somewhat after a few statements by the Danish and Norwegian prime ministers in March and April. In Norway the new Norwegian prime minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, declared that an NWF-zone in the Nordic countries must be supplemented by a reduction of the Soviet nuclear arms in the Baltic Sea and on the Kola Peninsula. And in Copenhagen Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen made it clear that he as

well believed that the absence of nuclear weapons should be extended to areas outside the Nordic countries.

Uncertain

With that -- it could justifiably be said in Washington -- the entire matter had been put off to an uncertain future, since the Soviet Union has clearly said, through the government mouthpiece IZVESTIYA, among others, that there can be no question of any Soviet nuclear weapons being affected by a Nordic zone.

In mid-May, however, a leading Norwegian politician, the former chairman of the Labor Party Reinulf Steen, expressed his own interpretation of the official Norwegian (and Nordic Social Democratic) position.

The fact that a Nordic NWF-zone should be established "as a link" in the work for general nuclear disarmament in Europe does not, in his opinion, mean that the one must necessarily take place at the same time as the other. Membership in NATO does not prohibit Norway from taking initiatives jointly with the other Nordic countries in order to promote peace and detente in this part of the world.

And, as could be predicted, the first U.S. expression of displeasure arrived. On Tuesday Thomas Eagleburger, assistant secretary of state for European Affairs, declared that in Washington people view "with concern" the "unbalanced" debate about an NWF-zone in the Nordic countries.

In Sweden as well the official government position is that an NWF-zone must not include merely the territories of the Nordic countries.

Ullsten

"As for the extent of a potential, agreement-bound, Nordic nuclear weapons-free zone, we believe that the Baltic Sea, among others, must be included in it," said for example Foreign Minister Ola Ullsten at the disarmament debate in Parliament last Wednesday. "In connection with the NWF-zone there ought to be a thinning-out zone, from which nuclear weapons primarily intended for deployment against targets within the nuclear weapons-free zone should be withdrawn."

What the Swedish side is mainly referring to are the six Soviet so-called GOLF submarines -- with a total of 18 missiles in the megaton class -- which have been patrolling the Baltic for several years. Further, one has in mind the Soviet so-called SCUD and FROG missiles based on the Kola Peninsula and in the Baltic countries, both with such a short range that they can scarcely have any land targets other than in the Nordic countries.

Here is a certain difference between the official Swedish government position and the opinion voiced by the Social Democrats. Thus, the government maintains that a potential NWF-zone in the Nordic countries must include all of the Baltic Sea and that the zone itself must be supplemented by a "thinning-out zone." The Social Democrats in principle agree with this position, but at the same time believe that the issue ought to be approached without prejudice.

"It is not we in Sweden who should pose conditions for negotiations," said for example Mats Hellstrom (Social Democrat) in the parliamentary debate last Wednesday.

A realistic evaluation of the various proposals for an NWF-zone which have been submitted must, according to several observers with whom the DAGENS NYHETER has spoken, lead to the conclusion that we will scarcely witness the establishment of such a zone in the foreseeable future.

Finland (and the Soviet Union) would welcome a solution in line with the Kekkonen Plan. But a zone which includes only the Nordic countries is totally unacceptable not only to Norway and Denmark (and NATO) but also to Sweden.

Unacceptable

A Nordic zone which is supplemented by restrictions concerning the Soviet nuclear weapons in the Baltic Sea and on the Kola Peninsula is just as unacceptable to the Soviet Union.

Regulations for a thinning-out of nuclear weapons in the western Soviet Union and in northern Western Europe would, in today's political situation, at any rate, be unacceptable at least to NATO -- and perhaps to the Soviet Union as well.

The question is then why the various proposals are even brought up by official government sides in the Nordic countries.

One answer often heard by observers with insight into official thinking is that it is a matter of an involved game for the purpose of neutralizing the anti-nuclear weapons sentiments on the radical left edge. This is particularly evident in Norway -- and then above all internally within the Labor Party -- where there have traditionally been strong pacifist currents from which the government and the Social Democratic party leadership have felt strong and recently increasing pressure.

At the same time the political parties certainly also feel the pressure of genuine popular concern and regard it as their task to channel this concern into political action.

11949
CSO: 3109/198

ROYAL NAVY TO BE AFFECTED BY SPENDING CUTS

Rome IL BORGHESE in Italian 31 May 81 p 281

[Article by Miles: "Madam Thatcher Sinks the Royal Navy"]

[Text] With the "dismissal" last week of British Under-Secretary of the Navy Speed, a struggle "to the last ship" began between Mrs Thatcher and the gentlemen at the Admiralty.

The issue arose following indiscretions reaching the British press regarding a reduction in the British armed forces budget. The programmed savings in particular were to hit mostly the Royal Navy, next the BAOR (the British expeditionary corps in Europe [British Army of the Rhine]), then the army and finally, in a much gentler fashion, the RAF.

As far as we have been able to learn, the royal navy over the next 10 years is supposed to save 18 trillion lire.

The response from the Admiralty was drastic: This "saving" will force the Navy to mothball 79 surface vessels, to eliminate the Royal Marines, and to discharge no less than 30,000 personnel out of the current strength of about 66,000.

The reason behind this decimation has to do with the British prime minister's "infatuation" (according to individuals who oppose these "savings") with the Trident nuclear missile system.

The Trident system, for the moment installed only on four submarines, is to be increased to 16 units in 10 years.

To achieve that, Madam Thatcher has "liquidated" 90 percent of the surface units, including frigates and destroyers, whose existence in squadron form made it possible to maintain control of the North Atlantic sealanes.

As a matter of fact, the British contribution to NATO in the naval area, as reported in the "White Book" of Defense published last year, is this: four Polaris submarines, armed with SSBN missiles; another 25 both nuclear and conventional submarines; six capital units including aircraft carriers and assault ships; about 70 frigates and destroyers (almost all equipped with shipboard helicopters); four squadrons of Sea King ASW helicopters, and about 30 auxiliary vessels for logistic support on the high seas.

completely eliminating support based on medium-sized units of the destroyer and frigate type, all of the surface vessels will remain without any close-in defense against enemy attacks. Besides, the large number of helicopters on shipboard will have to be left ashore. This will be a big help to Soviet nuclear submarines which will no longer have to fear surveillance by sonar and ASW buoys guided by the shipboard Sea King helicopters.

Again in contrast with the "White Book," the elimination of the medium-sized units could leave defenseless the line of escorts for reinforcement vessels that might possibly arrive from the United States. The English Channel itself would be stripped of surveillance and would be completely under the control of Soviet units.

By putting all her eggs into the Trident basket, Madam Thatcher has designed a fleet totally based on nuclear submarines equipped with SSBN, assisted by a few aircraft carriers and some support vessels.

Another tremendous error seems to be the planned elimination of the Royal Marines. Stationed in two cities, in Plymouth (Major General Royal Marines Commando Forces) and Portsmouth (Major General Royal Marines Training and Reserve Forces), the Royal Marines, together with the special forces stationed in Ulster, are the "spearhead" of the British rapid deployment force.

Its organizational structure is based on the NATO Brigade although the units constituting the Corps are able to operate independently.

The primary mission of the Royal Marines is, together with the NATO allies, to reinforce and defend the front in Norway, Denmark, and the Atlantic Islands.

If necessary, SACLANT until now was able to count on the following forces: one brigade HQ, four Royal Marines Commandos, one amphibious battle group of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, several amphibious units, miscellaneous attack and logistic support helicopters, totalling 7,000 men.

If the revolution announced in Great Britain is really carried out, the Russians will also be able to think that they have won the first big battle in World War III.

In recent years, NATO has created a military structure capable of fighting without any need to use nuclear forces, except in the very last instance.

Madam Thatcher has turned this concept upside down. By risking everything on the atomic deterrent, she has created an imbalance, both political and military, whose consequences are easily understood.

Without help from the Royal Navy and the Royal Marines, one quarter of the NATO ready-action deployment will fall by the wayside. Without the Royal Marines, almost any local operation in the North Atlantic will be based only on the Americans.

The absence of naval control over Russian submarines will create a vacuum which certainly cannot be filled by the little Dutch or Danish or Norwegian navies.

The desire "at all costs" to stop inflation has caused the British prime minister to lose sight of the real purpose of naval defense for the islands. Ever since Queen Elizabeth I decided to boost the fleet, Great Britain, initially, and the British Empire later on, relied, not so much on the bayonets of the "Redcoats" but rather on the ships that flew the Union Jack. The example of the East India Company is symptomatic.

Although it may seem a little early to say so, the political crisis of the British government began with this recourse to "domestic economizing."

The British force stationed in Ulster will lack fighting spirit and determination. How can one believe in a government force to tighten its purse strings only to buy a new toy?

Because that is what morale boils down to. Mrs Thatcher has sacrificed the real security constituted by the British Fleet around the islands for a possible future fleet of nuclear submarines.

Nelson would say that Mrs Thatcher in this case did not do what Great Britain expects of her--her duty.

9038
CSO: 3104/304

INVESTIGATIONS OF ATHENS ARSONS, PROGRESS REPORTED

Identification of Suspects

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 6 Jun 81 pp 1, 4

[Article by Dim. G. Mathiopoulos: "Ten More Are Being Sought in Connection With the Arsons"]

[Text] The Athens General Security [GAA] is searching for 10 more persons in connection with the arsons, in addition to the sisters Litsa and Katina Tsangaraki who continue to evade arrest. Fifteen more young persons are being held by the police and interrogated by Intelligence Service officers in the presence of the public prosecutor. All are independent anarchists and according to the police there are indications that those being sought are connected with the bombings of automobiles, supermarkets and stores in Athens since 1979.

GAA officers believe that the two sisters who are still at large are the "key" to the arsons and it is expected that the results of their interrogation will lead security services to the disbandment of a terrorist group.

The Tsangaraki sisters left their home (105-107 Filolaou) last Tuesday evening--a few hours before the two department stores were set on fire--and have disappeared since. One of them was seen at 0200 hours Wednesday in a confectionary store of Kefalari in Kifisia. She was alone and left just before the store closed when a young couple picked her up in a black automobile.

A government official said that the police has gathered much information which is being evaluated by Intelligence Service officers. Among other things, the police confiscated proclamations about the arsons from 1979 until now, four typewriters and bottles with unknown content. These have been sent to the Criminal Services Directorate [DEY] for content analysis and identification. On the other hand, DEY officers will check the typewriters to find out if they were used for typing the proclamations. According to other information the GAA is carrying out extensive searches of homes and other places in an effort to find the mimeograph used for printing the proclamations.

A government official pointed out that "it depends on the investigating magistrate to evaluate the information gathered thus far and to refer to the public prosecutor those being held on suspicion." The same official added that six more homes were

searched and that several persons were brought to GAA. A total of 30 suspects were apprehended following the arsons in the Klaoudatos and Athens department stores. Half of them were released for lack of evidence against them.

In a telephone call yesterday to the Athens Press Agency an unidentified person said: "The Popular Revolutionary Struggle assumes responsibility for the arsons. We have humiliated the police and the Tsangaraki sisters are not about to be found.." Regardless of the result of the search for the two sisters, a senior police official expressed concern that the wide publicity given them will cause the disappearance of much evidence. "Not only evidence but also some of their collaborators will disappear," added the police official.

Six-Month Surveillance

According to a police source, GAA was on the trail of suspects immediately after the Hanion and Katrandzos-Sport fires. Since then the police have begun the surveillance of certain persons who belong to various organizations and particularly of young persons (males and females) who are independent anarchists. During this period the police followed the suspicious movements of certain persons which, however, did not warrant their arrest. Among them was Litsa Tsangaraki, 23, who had relations with Bouketsidis, the man accused of setting on fire the tax collector's office in Nikaia. He was acquitted by the court but during the period he was held in custody he was visited by Litsa.

During the surveillance of the suspects, a woman's handbag, which was found in a street following a demonstration, was handed over to the police. Among other things, the bag contained a letter containing revealing information about terrorist activities. The content of the letter increased the police suspicions about certain individuals.

It also became known that one of the typewriters was found in the home of the Tsangaraki sisters whose pictures have been forwarded to all security forces and all exit stations of the country. The investigation thus far has shown that the two sisters have not escaped abroad. Police officials believe that both sisters are in hiding in Athens.

In Salonica

Salonica, 5 June. From our correspondent--National Security men have today carried out an extensive search in homes of anarchists and foreign students throughout Salonica. A police spokesman said that no arrest were made. It was learned, however, that the police are looking for three young foreigners who are temporary residents of Salonica.

This morning someone telephoned a newspaper to report that the two sisters were seen on Markou Botsari Street. Two hours later an unknown person telephoned the same newspaper to report that "Klaoudatos of Athens has been extinguished and the same thing will be done to the one in Salonica by the Bolaris group which is fighting oppression."

Athens Bar Association

The administrative council of the Athens Bar Association points out in an announcement that the arsons of stores in Athens are atrocious crimes not only against the country's economy but also against democracy. "Those who committed them and those who instigate them," says the announcement, "have no other motive or objective than to serve the wicked circles here and abroad whose objective is to disorganize and destroy." The announcement concludes:

"The defense against these criminals is an obligation of the state and all concerned--government, justice and the people--should work toward this end."

Further Developments

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 7 June 81 pp 1, 2

/Article by Dim. G. Mathiopoulos: "The Two Sisters Deny All Charges"/

/Text/ It appears that one of the confiscated typewriters found in homes of suspects may have been used for typing the mimeograph stencil for the proclamations. This is the impression officers of the security services formed after a preliminary examination of the typewriter which was sent to the Criminal Services Directorate. A police expert will thoroughly check its keys one by one to find out if the typewriter had been definitely used for this purpose or if it is moded differently than the one used for typing the stencil. If it is established that it was used for this purpose then the police will have "evidence" as to the activities of the suspects. This, however, does not mean that the police will be in a position to disband the terrorist group. But it may be able to locate an echelon whose members, however, may not be connected with the bombings and arsons of the Athenian stores.

The Two Sisters

Yesterday afternoon, lawyer Evangelos Giannopoulos (former president of the Athens Bar Association) who is representing the two missing sisters sent the newspapers an announcement which included the following statement by them:

"We have no connection whatever with the crime which, in violation of the elementary legal and police methods, attempts are being made to attribute to us." Litsa and Katerina Tsangaraki state also that they are at the disposal of justice and conclude: "Our absence from our home is a protection of our persons and our constitutional rights which the police does not respect."

The above statement proves that the two sisters are in Athens and, as TO VIMA reported yesterday, they are determined to appear before the judicial authorities. A few hours following the statement of the Tsangaraki sisters an officer of the Athens General Security telephoned lawyer Giannopoulos and asked that the hiding sisters present themselves to the police for interrogation in the presence of the public prosecutor.

New Search of Homes Yesterday

The search of homes of suspects continued yesterday while GAA officers interrogated more apprehended suspects. Some of them have been sought since last Wednesday following the arsons of the Klaoudatos and Athens department stores. It was not known if discriminating evidence was found in the searched homes or against the interrogated suspects.

Of interest is the fact that the authorities maintained absolute secrecy about developments in the case which (secrecy) can be interpreted in two different ways:

a. That the investigation has reached a critical point and in order to achieve full disbandment of the group a blackout (on information) is imposed.

b. That the investigation has reached a deadlock and no justification can be given for the written announcement the authorities made last Thursday morning about the Tsangaraki sisters.

In any case, 10 persons, mostly young, were brought to police headquarters yesterday and are being interrogated by GAA officers. At the same time, a police officer said that the more the investigation and interrogation of suspects continues the more is the impression enhanced that some of the persons being held as well as most of those being sought are behind the arsons of stores and automobiles. He added that this impression is derived from information gathered through surveillance of the suspects, from printing material, etc., found in their homes during the search made after the criminal action against the Klaoudatos and Athens stores.

On the other hand, the police announced that it is not known what type of material or devices the culprits used in the fires of the four Athenian stores. The GAA authorities, however, believe that improvised, handmade time bombs were used, made with gasoline or other flammable material. Bottles of unknown content were found in homes of suspects. They and the typewriters were handed over to the Criminal Service Directorate for checking.

7520
CSO: 4621/13

TRADE DEFICIT EXPECTED TO WORSEN LATER IN 1981

Copenhagen MANEDS BORSEN in Danish 14 May 81 p 14

[Article: "Exports Will Rise in the Second Half Year, but Imports Even More"]

[Text] While most other Western industrial countries struggle with rising deficits in their foreign trade, our trade figures are improving steadily. The monthly deficits in the trade balance are still very modest and everything indicates that we shall have a surplus in the goods and services exchange in the first 6 months. But despite the fact that we now sell more abroad than we buy, there is no prospect of a balance of payments surplus. On the contrary, the increasing burden of interest on our foreign debt indicates that during the first 6 months we will probably have a deficit of approximately the same size as that of the fourth quarter of 1980, namely a deficit of about 2.5 billion kroner per quarter.

The persuasive change in foreign trade is due to the fortunate combination of increasing exports and decreasing imports. Thus, measured in kroner and ore, exports rose by 6 percent in February to 8.5 billion kroner, while imports dropped by 8 percent to about 9 billion kroner. The balance of trade deficit amounted to a little over .5 billion kroner, as against a little less than 2 billion kroner in February, 1980.

Industry, primarily, accounted for the good export figures. In February, industrial exports accounted for 5.4 billion kroner, or 9.5 percent more than the year before Animal agricultural exports increased by 8 percent to 1.4 billion kroner. Vegetable agricultural exports, meat and condensed milk dropped slightly. Imports reflect the sad picture of the nation's economic stagnation. Imports of construction materials dropped by 16 percent in February, imports of industrial raw materials by 13 percent, machinery and other capital goods by 22 percent, and means of transportation by 33 percent. Only imports of consumer goods held their position. Thus we import less because investment in industry and construction has come to a halt and because raw material stocks are being drawn down. The present very considerable drop in imports is therefore only temporary. When raw material stock reduction comes to an end imports will increase again, to be further stimulated by the increase in private consumption that everything indicates will take place during the second 6 months.

Prospects for exports are moderately favorable for the second 6 months. To be sure, our three largest exports customers, Great Britain, West Germany, and Sweden,

are faced with greater economic problems than the other OECD countries, and there is hardly any prospect of the economic outlook improving markedly within the foreseeable future. On the other hand, the improved competitive position attained by Danish industry in 1980 as a result of the 15 percent devaluation of the krone will assure that we can improve our footing in our export markets.

However, increased exports during the second 6 months will not suffice to make up for increasing imports, and it is therefore to be expected that the balance of trade, including the balance of payments, will noticeably increase during the second quarter of this year.

In total, exports are expected to rise by a coup' of percentage points this year. Industrial exports by volume will on the whole ain at the same level as l t year, while agricultural exports will increase by about 3 percent. At current prices, industrial exports are expected at about 14 percent [sic]. Imports will drop by about 5.5 percent, about the same as last year. However, since import prices are increasing by about 15 percent, imports measured in kroner increase by about 9 percent. The entire growth will be concentrated in the second 6 months. The balance of trade deficit will amount to a little over 11 billion kroner this year, as against about 15 billion last year.

Since at the same time a modest improvement in the services balance is expected, the surplus increasing from about 13 to 14 billion kroner, everything indicates that we shall this year have a modest surplus in the goods and services balance. This happened in 1975, 1972, and 1963. Unfortunately, however, increasing interest expenditures on foreign debt will cause this year's balance of payments deficit to be of approximately the same size as last year.



Exports remain at a rather imposing level, while imports have hit bottom as a consequence of low economic activity and stock reduction. The trade balance deficit has therefore been significantly reduced. The deficit will rise again during the second six months of the year as a result of new stockpiling and expected rise in consumption.

1. Export and import developments.

11,256
CSO: 3106/125

REAL WAGES, CONSUMPTION EXPECTED TO RISE IN 1981

Copenhagen MANEDS BORSEN in Danish 14 May 81 p 12

[Article: "Real Wages and Consumption to Increase Markedly this Year."]

[Text] Despite the fact that the labor contracts must be regarded as moderate, wages will this year rise somewhat more than last year. At the same time there are no prospects for new tax increases, and this will unavoidably stimulate consumption noticeably.

The wage increases are primarily due to the fact that this year cost of living increases will hit will full force. The wage contracts, plus other modest wage increases, will give a typical LO [National Federation of Labor Unions] worker an income increase of 4.5 percent this year, compared to 7.5 percent last year. Cost of living increase provide 5 percent, compared to only 1.5 percent last year. On the whole, cost of living increases were not in effect through most of 1980. The December, 1979 labor contracts cancelled the three cost of living increases resulting from the January price index, and the October cost of living increase provided only .60 krone per hour. This year three cost of living increases at .90 krone per hour will be paid, increases, be it noted, that will be paid. In total, the average hourly wage in the LO area will rise by about 9.5 percent this year, compared to 8.5 percent in 1980.

For the first time since 1973 there is a fair chance this year that public employees will receive higher pay increases than workers in the private labor market. This is because their contracts, including "catch-up" adjustments, provide more, and because step increase adjustments give a lift to public salaries this year. The step increase adjustment was undertaken against the background of wage adjustment in the private labor market last year and because, due to the lack of cost of living increases, wage increases were unusually high. Since at the same time cost of living increases were noticeably improved, pay in the public sector will rise by 11 percent this year, as against about 7 percent last year. Social pensions are expected to rise by about 9 percent, while unemployment compensation will be increased by only 7.5 percent, i.e. somewhat less than wages.

In other words, an average wage earner/pensioner will this year have a 9 percent income increase, or approximately the same as last year. However, since in the meantime prices are increasing by about 10.5 percent and taxes by .5 percent, a typical wage earner suffers a loss of about 2 percent in his real disposable

income. Last year disposable real income dropped by 5% percent, the largest drop in the postwar years. The drop in real wages will take place during the first 6 months of the year, however. The contract increases and the cost of living increases will assure an even real wage improvement through the year. Even though disposable real wages will on the average drop by 1.5 percent this year, it does not mean that private consumption will drop correspondingly. This is due to the fact that the number of wage earners is increasing. Last year 90,000 new persons entered the labor market, and nothing indicates that the increase will be less this year. New job seekers amount to 2 percent of the labor force, and this will in turn produce a corresponding increase in the total of disposable real income. In other words, even though the disposable real income of the individual wage earner drops, total disposable income does not drop noticeably because of the continuing great influx into the labor market. Consumption will therefore not drop significantly this year. Due to developments in disposable real wages, private consumption during the first 6 months will be about 4 percent below that of the first 6 months of last year, but during the second 6 months consumption will be a little over 1 percent above that of the last 6 months of 1980. Retail trade thus faces a brighter future as we approach the darker season.



Disposable real income will drop this year by a couple of percentage points for most wage earners. The entire drop will be concentrated in the first 6 months, however, whereupon a new increase is expected in the last 6 months.

Key

1. Development of disposable real income
2. Pensioners (married couple)
3. Workers
4. Public employees

11,256
CSO: 3106/125

THREE COST OF LIVING RAISES EXPECTED TO BE PAID

Copenhagen MANEDS BORSEN in Danish 14 May 81 p 13

[Article: "Three Cost of Living Increases May be Paid This Year."]

[Text] Inflation made a great leap in March. On an annual basis consumer prices rose by all of 25 percent from February to March, the greatest increase in a single month for 5 years. Many things indicate, however, that the March price explosion will be a single swallow, and that inflation will once more take on a more quiet pace in the course of the summer and fall months. The consumer price index rose by 2 percent from February to March. Fuel prices rose by 5.6 percent, transportation by 2.8 percent, and even depressed day-to-day consumer goods such as clothing and footwear increased by 2.5 percent. The price jump was due primarily to expiration of price control, the strengthening of the dollar, causing higher prices for imported goods, and, finally, inclusion in sales prices of the cost of living increases, i.e. all factors that are more or less extraordinary. The skyrocketing dollar and the new wage agreements, as well as a continued adjustment of profit margins, will probably cause the price index to make another leap in April, and finally the housing account, including the abolition of rent control, will add fuel to the inflation fire in May. After this, however, there should be a basis for dampening of inflation. As an average for the year, consumer prices will lie at the level of 10.5 to 11 percent above 1980. Last year, inflation amounted to a little over 12 percent.

The price index for March was at 110.2, or 1.4 percent above that of the previous month.

The fact that the monthly price index rose more than the consumer price index was caused by energy prices not being included in monthly prices. Despite this, however, it is now certain that the July price index will call for two cost of living increases. Domestic inflation will even be so high during the spring months that the July price index will probably be a couple of points higher than the figure of 112 needed to call for the two cost of living increases. Thus we are well under way toward three cost of living increases in January, 1982. The price/wage spiral runs at its usual speed.

Only a few years ago the housing market was often designated the most important source of domestic inflation. This, however, has far from been the case during the past year. The most recent figures by Danish Statistics show that prices

for all types of Danish properties dropped in 1980. From the fourth quarter of 1979 to the fourth quarter of 1980, farm property prices dropped 14 percent and were turned over on the average of 116.7 percent of the 1977 value. Single family residences dropped 6 percent and summer houses by 7 percent.

Turnover also dropped drastically. Thus, in the fourth quarter of 1980 only 11,000 single-family houses were sold, as against over 15,000 in the same quarter of last year.

According to real estate brokers the market has now turned around and sales are rising. Optimism of the brokers will probably be further stimulated during the next few months simply because a number of factors point in the direction of increasing sales and consequently toward increasing property prices.

Disposable real income is increasing for most recipients. New housing construction has come to a complete halt and will hardly be resumed again, at least ot as far as single-family homes are concerned, until the price difference between new and old housing has been markedly reduced. Finally, rent control will be abolished as of 1 May, while at the same time the inflation jump of the spring will contribute to keeping intact inflation expectations. Also, the introduction of the social income concept will make the home ownership tax deficit more "valuable" than formerly.



Inflation took an upward lead in March. A number of factors of temporary nature, such as abolishment of price controls, the wage contracts, and cost of living increases, were the primary cause. Though energy prices are now removed from the monthly index, two cost of living increases will come at Christmas.

1. Consumer prices and the monthly price index, percentage of annual increases.
2. Consumer prices.
3. Old monthly price index.

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CSO: 3106/125

BRIEFS

USE OF EC FUNDS--Greenland and Denmark have been granted a total of 90 million kroner from EC's social fund. The money will primarily be used for training youth and for various plans for young unemployed persons under 25, according to the EC press and information office in Copenhagen. Greenland will receive 58.3 million kroner, to be used for training young Greenlanders. The iron metal trades in particular, and the construction sector, and merchandizing and office work will benefit from the money for training. The 312 million kroner that goes to Denmark will be used primarily for promoting employment measures for unemployed youth under the age of 25 in Arhus and Strorstrom Provinces. The EC social fund distributed a total of a little over 3 billion kroner. [Text] [Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 22 May 81 p 3] 11,256

CSO: 3106/126

ELECTION RESULTS, PRESIDENT'S STATUS ANALYZED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 30 May 81 p 3

[Article by Khr. A. Liveris: "When Will Kyprianou Concern Himself With Reality?"]

[Text] Now that we have removed all posters and banners from our towns and villages and [have recovered] from the first election surprises, all of us should be concerned about the future. And it is not only the leaders of the parties that should be truly concerned since, as a result of the elections, they have assumed the burden of the responsibility for the present and the future.

Personally, the first thought that occupied me was not whether I was right or wrong in my projections and predictions about the percentage [of votes] the various parties would receive. Subjectivity, however, does not allow for accurate predictions. But what I saw and heard during the campaign is an objective fact which was fully verified: the cultivation of illusions and the creation of myths must have been completely demolished while ambiguities must be considered a thing of the past. However, it has been proved in the most authentic way that all hopes for a better future have not been completely demolished.

The figures and percentages the people's will has awarded each party are implacable and prove an indisputable reality. The first uncoerced proof of these figures is that no area exists which during the campaign many advertised as free for anyone to win. The people have proved convincingly that they are well informed politically and that there is no margin in the so-called Center area which all newly established parties tried to create artificially during the campaign. It was simply a wrong impression and illusion they gave their followers. What appeared as a "void" was but a product of the imagination and wishful thinking based on old and certainly unrealistic evaluations. The truth is that in the past, with different protagonists in this area [of the Center], the people have given [the candidates] such trivial percentages as to completely eliminate vague speeches and promises. Besides this fact, another more basic finding is becoming a reality: the complete absence of the so-called Makarios forces which many tried to exploit as something living and permanent should be considered as a fact. There was only Makarios. The majority of forces which supported him dispersed the day after his death. Only the grave searchers maintain them. They searched for them during the campaign but no one was able to resurrect them, neither President Kyprianou nor the parties which suffered total [electoral] ruin; it would not be an exaggeration if indeed one said that these parties were eliminated definitely and irrevocably since it cannot be

argued that Makarios represented only 19.5 percent of the electorate or even 4.5 percent of the lilliputian parties.

But it is worth the effort for one to pause and seriously think about the post-electoral problems the party in power [Kyprianou] is creating and will keep creating continually throughout Cyprus. Unfortunately for our country, Kyprianou still maintains both his identities: president of the Cypriot state and chairman of the Democratic Party [DIKO].

Personally, I am not interested in what he said during the campaign, that is, that he is capable of separating his two identities whenever he likes or when it is in his interest. This I never believed. What interests me, since it concerns all the people and will have an impact on the future of the Cyprus problem and our domestic problems, is that from a majority, nonpartisan leader he is a president and leader of a party which comes third [in number of deputies] among the four parties represented in the House of Representatives.

For known but unclear reasons, no [presidential] election took place then but now the way the people voted under the proportional system amounts to a true plebiscite. It became apparent beyond any doubt that only one fifth of the Greek [Cypriot] population approves his views and trusts him. The undisputable sad testimony of 24 May 1981 must have affected President Kyprianou's sensitivity because 80.5 percent of the population does not follow him and therefore does not trust him.

With their vote the people clearly demonstrated not only what they want but also politically took a stand against the political deceit Lyssaridis enunciated during the campaign, against the indecisiveness and incompetence AKEL charged or the haphazardness and amateurism Ioannidis charged as [AKEL] interlocator.

The positions of the Democratic Rally were fully vindicated and it won 12 seats in the House of Representatives thus putting an end to AKEL's claim that it was the majority party in the House. Moreover, the majority of the refugees did not support the party in power [DIKO] because they discovered how little it did for so many.

If the election results have not yet made Kyprianou aware of the reality, he may not be able to stop in time the decay which for a long time has been destroying his party. On the other hand, his appeals as head of state for unity and as a party leader against a split constitutes an immense moral problem which concerns the survival of our country, the reason being that any decision he takes is his but Cyprus belongs to all those who love it.

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CSO: 4621/8

NAMES OF WINNERS IN CYPRIOT ELECTIONS PUBLISHED

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 May 81 pp 1, 3

[Article by special correspondent Alekos Trakas: "A Confrontation Without Victors or Vanquished"]

[Text] Nicosia--No victor emerged from last Sunday's elections and the parties, especially the Democratic Rally [DISY] and AKEL, the two larger ones which had boasted during the campaign that they would score an impressive victory, did not provide their followers with the opportunity to celebrate. The final results gave 12 seats to each of these two parties and reduced the vote percentage difference between them to 0.88 percent in favor of AKEL (2,169 more votes).

Thus, following the sinking of the small parties, the question of coalition has become more imperative but also more difficult for reasons of principle and also because of the differences and antipathies which prevailed before and during the campaign.

No matter what the balancing role of the Democratic Party [DIKO] of President Kyprianou appears to be at first, it is almost certain that the attempt for cooperation either with the Left or Right will meet with difficulties. Moreover, some observers believe that AKEL now assumes a great balancing role while that of DIKO becomes smaller.

The election of the speaker of the House of Representatives will provide the opportunity for ascertaining the temper and intentions of the parties. It was reported yesterday that it is very probable that the candidacy of DIKO Deputy G. Ladas for the speakership with the help of AKEL as prearranged may not be realized. Moreover, other candidates were also reported.

Initiative for Unity

A "low key" first effort by nonparliamentary leaders to find a candidate acceptable to all parties for the purpose of relaxing the preelection antipathies and of sending the people some message of unity has been developing since midnight yesterday. President Kyprianou also stressed the need for unity in a statement he made. He said, in part:

"Now that the election turmoil is over, I call on all the Cypriot people to unite in the common effort for progress and prosperity and particularly in the struggle for survival and vindication and for an honorable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of the UN resolutions and the summit agreements--a solution which should restore the unity of the state and the people and should safeguard the rights of all citizens of Cyprus."

AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou also supported the need for unity of all patriotic forces in a statement in which he avoided his usual attack against the Democratic Rally and its leader Kliridis and only underlined that "AKEL's victory placed a barrier to NATO's plans for Cyprus." Papaioannou, moreover, as well as AKEL's official organ HARAVGI, took for granted the "unity" of the "patriotic forces" without, however, defining them.

Kliridis' Position

The Democratic Rally made it apparent yesterday that it will continue the struggle in a parliamentary and democratic context without, however, defining its position on any further cooperation or in what form. On the contrary, there was a report that Kliridis will propose his own candidate for the speakership, presumably to expose the AKEL-DIKO cooperation.

The Agapinidis EDEK party considers the election outcome satisfactory because, as it claims, despite AKEL's campaign against its leader, it increased its strength and points out that it will continue its uncompromised struggle for a solution to the Cyprus problem. EDEK circles do not rule out the nomination of its own candidate for the speakership.

But, regardless of the general recognition of the need for unity, it is believed almost certain that there will be many problems which will become more acute due to the high tensions in the relations among the parties--tensions cultivated by certain leaders for different reasons. All political leaders are facing this problem of acute tension.

Results

The final election results are as follows: AKEL, 95,302 votes (32.779 percent), DIKO, 56,705 (19.053 percent), DISY, 92,733 (31.895 percent), EDEK, 23,870 (8.176 percent), Center Union (Papadopoulos), 7,964 (2.739 percent), Youth of the Democratic Front (Pikhatlidis), 5,582 (1.920 percent), and Pan-Cyprian Front (PAKY) (Sofianos), 8,100 votes (2.788 percent).

The youngest member of the new House of Representatives is Giannakos Omirou, 30, a lawyer from Paphos. He belongs to EDEK. For the first time, the Cypriot House of Representatives will have a female member--Rina Kateeli, 42. She is a member of DIKO and was elected in the Kyrenia District (her husband is minister to the president).

By party, the deputies elected are:

DIKO: Georgios Ladas, 68, lawyer (Nicosia), Thalis Mikhailidis, 54, physician (Nicosia), Dim. Liveras, 48, lawyer (Nicosia), Kimon Panagidis, 50, graduate of Law and Economics School (Limassol), Andreas Pellidis, 50, architect (Limassol), Kyr. Papadimitriou, 59, physician (Paphos), Alex. Galanos, 41, lawyer-economist (Famagusta), Rina Katseli, 42, author-painter (Kyrenia).

DIKI: Glavkos Kliridis, 51, lawyer (Nicosia), Ioan. Matsis, 48, lawyer (Nicosia), Man. Khristofidis, 40, lawyer (Nicosia), Leond. Ierodiakonou, 42, political scientist (Nicosia), Nikos Anastasiadis, 35, lawyer (Limassol), Avg. Papares, 50 (Limassol), Kon. Khatzikakou, 57, physician (Famagusta), Kon. Lordos, 41, architect (Famagusta), Khristos Solomis, 39, lawyer (Famagusta), And. Mathikolonis, 32, lawyer (Larnaca), Georg. Georgiou, 31, lawyer (Larnaca), Georgios Papadopoulos, 56, physician (Paphos).

AKEL: Ezekias Papaioannou, 73 (Limassol), AKEL secretary general since 1949, And. Fantis, 63, AKEL assistant secretary general (Famagusta), Khambis Mikhailidis, 61 (Famagusta), Mikhalis Poumbouris, 62, member of the Pan-Cyprian Refugee Committee (Famagusta), D. nos Konstantinou, 56 (Nicosia), AKEL central organisational secretary (studied economics in Prague), Georgios Savvidis, 61, philologist (Nicosia), Khr. Petas, 59, member of AKEL's Central Committee and Politburo (Nicosia), Pavlos Dinglis, 50 (Nicosia), Ph.D in economic and social sciences (studied in Moscow), And. Ziartidis, 62, secretary general of the Pan-Cyprian Syndicalist Organisation (Larnaca), Nikos Mavronikolas, 72, studied at Athens Law School (Paphos), Khr. Kourtelaris, 62, worker (Kyrenia), Kyr. Khristou, 66 (Limassol), AKEL district secretary.

EDEK: Vasos Lyssaridis, 61, physician (Nicosia), Iak. Katsounotos, 55, syndicalist (Limassol), Giannakis Omirou, 30, lawyer (Paphos).

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CSO: 4621/3

EDITORIAL ANALYZES AKEL ELECTION GAINS

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 30 May 81 p 5

[Editorial Comment by Tavvas Iakovidis: "AKEL's 'Resplendent' Victory"]

[Text] This column does not agree with AKEL's positions, inclinations, policy and tactics as they concern the country's various problems. The views and personal opinions of this writer have been repeatedly presented with proper arguments; neither this column nor the writer suffer from anti-communist hysteria. On the contrary, they expect a large party--as AKEL claims to be--to behave responsibly, seriously, prudently and not opportunistically. Above all, it must respect the intelligence and tolerance or nerve endurance of its members and especially the typical people. AKEL has repeatedly proven that it does not behave responsibly and seriously. It is of course its right to follow this policy and tactics, just as it is the right to proclaim, adulate and extol that it stems from Moscow and its satellites.

No one doubts and AKEL does not hide the fact that it wants and insists, with religious fervor, on serving and ministering the plans and objectives of international communism. The bourgeois democracy it wants to abolish gives it this right too. But even in a democracy, unaccountability, whether partisan, political or of another type, has its limits. And the mockery of the people's intelligence cannot replace the true facts nor the self-controlled confronting of realities. The recent elections have shown once more AKEL's extent of unaccountability and mockery of the people's intelligence. Before the final election results were announced KHARAVGI wrote about a victory of the patriotic forces. And before the exact number of [parliamentary] seats each party had won became known, AKEL Secretary General Papaioannou spoke about "a resplendent victory of the working people."

AKEL and Papaioannou attempted and to an extent succeeded in deceiving their naive followers and a section of the people. The facts: According to the official final results, AKEL received 95,304 votes or 32.769 percent. On the other hand, the Democratic Rally [DISY] received 92,886 votes or 31.918 percent. The struggle for first place [majority in the house] between AKEL and DISY was hard fought. In the end both parties elected 12 deputies each. Papaioannou and his party are asked: Does this represent an AKEL "resplendent victory?" Is this a "significant difference" between AKEL and DISY? Only [a difference of] 2,418 votes? Is this the "large percentage of votes" this communist party received? Only 0.851 percent? Is this the first place AKEL claimed and for which it brainwashed its followers?

Speaking last Friday, 22 May, at Freedom Square, Papaioannou said to his followers: "Now allow me to reveal to you a secret. A responsible, exacting survey which we completed only last week shows that AKEL-Left will be the majority party in the House. Of importance, however, is the large percentage of votes it will receive" (KHARAVGI, 23 June 1981, page 3).

The elections proved and clearly demonstrated that AKEL did not receive a large percentage of votes nor was there a significant difference between it and DISY. The difference is trivial and politically ridiculous. The difference is rather a useless gift to AKEL if we bear in mind that for many years this party cultivated the myth that allegedly was the greatest one in the Cypriot political arena.

The proportional /electoral system/ proved AKEL's true dimensions. It is a party that represents only one third of the people. Therefore, Papaioannou's enthusiastic statements are useless and politically imprudent since every intelligent and earnest AKEL member has ascertained that it has been a victim of mockery and deception. The party's secretary general also is attempting a similar mockery by /citing/ percentages and votes in an effort to cover and hide the party's failure. Many and ordinary are the AKEL members who publicly expressed their displeasure and anger because the party's leadership deceived them in a most barbarous and vile manner. And many are these ordinary members who do not tolerate nor obey the directives of their old and arteriosclerotic leadership. Proof of it is the many preference votes cast for candidate deputies who were not recommended or imposed by the party.

The myths AKEL has cultivated and promoted for years have begun to collapse and fade away. The mockery and deception the party leadership is again attempting are no longer tolerated. Papaioannou and his comrades should know that by now and should not think that they deal with political tag-alongs and remote /Moscow/ controlled lotus-eaters.

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CSO: 4621/8

BIOGRAPHIC SKETCHES OF NEW DISY DEPUTIES PUBLISHED

Nicosia I SIMERINI in Greek 26 May 81 p 7

[Text] [Following are biographic reports on the recently elected deputies under the banner of the Democratic Rally [DISY]. No biographic sketch was given for DISY leader Glavkos Kliridis.]

Nicosia District Deputies:

TOASOS KAPSOS: Born in Palaiokhori in 1933; married, two children; graduate of Famagusta Gymnasium and American Academy; studied law in London; EOKA leading cadre during 1955-58 liberation struggle; in 1958 a price was set on his head as fugitive; founding cadre of the United Democratic Regeneration Front which he served as district secretary; elected member of the Communal Assembly from which he resigned in 1962; served as DISY general secretary; elected as one of the two DISY vice presidents in 1980; member, DISY Political Office, Political Committee and Central Council.

LEONTIOS IERODIAKONOU: Born in Dali, 1941; graduate of Pan-Cyprian gymnasium; studied political science at the Pandeios Supreme School of Political Sciences; continued studies in Stockholm receiving the M.S. degree in political science; Ph.D in political science, Upsala University, Sweden; served as deputy, 1976-81; author of "The Cypriot Problem" in Greek and English; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council.

PAVLOS KHRISTOFIDIS: Born in Levka, 1941; married; two children; graduate of Pan-Cyprian gymnasium and Athens University Law School; practices law; participated in 1955-59 liberation struggle; held responsible positions in the EOKA B Valiant Youth and Pan-Cyprian Union of Cypriot Fighters; leading cadre of the student movement; president of the Federation of the National Student Unions of Cyprus [OMEK] and delegate in many international conferences; presently president of Nicosia Bar Association and leader of DISY Youth; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council.

Famagusta District Deputies

KOSTAS KHATZIIOANNIDAKOU: Born in Famagusta, 1924; married, four children; graduate of the Nicosia English School; studied general sciences at Beirut University; graduated from the Manchester University Medical School and specialised in

orthopedics at Glascow University; presently practicing orthopedics; served as military physician in the National Guard; served as deputy, 1970-76; served as member of Famagusta Municipality Health Committee; presently DISY Famagusta district secretary; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council.

KHRISTOS SOLOMIS: Born in Famagusta, 1941; married, two children; graduate of the Famagusta Greek gymnasium and Athens University School of Law; presently practices law; participated actively in 1955-59 liberation struggle and was held in various prisons; volunteered in National Guard after interrupting his studies in 1964; elected president of the Famagusta Bar Association in 1980; member, DISY Famagusta district committee; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council since the party's founding.

KONSTANDINOS LORDOS: Born in Famagusta, 1940; married, two children; studied economics and architecture in London receiving his B.A. with honors in architecture; entrepreneur and director in various companies; served as volunteer in the National Guard, 1963-66; served as president of the National Union of Cypriot Students in England; presently president of the Famagusta Refugee Movement; member, Famagusta Coordinating Committee; member of Committee of Contact with the Interlocutor; member, DISY Famagusta District Committee; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council since party's founding.

Larnaca District Deputies

GEORGIOS GEORGIOU: Born in Larnaca, 1949; married; lawyer; graduate of Athens University Law School; served as member of Planning and Development Committee and as OEFEK secretary; member, Larnaca Bar Association; Larnaca district DISY youth secretary; DISY director for enlightenment; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council since the party's founding.

ANDREAS KATHIKOLONIS: Born in Larnaca, 1949; married, one child; lawyer; graduated from Athens University Law School; secretary, Larnaca Bar Association.

Paphos District Deputy

GEORGIOS (KOSTA) PAPADOPOULOS: Born in Lasa of Paphos, 1925; married, two children; graduate of Paphos gymnasium; graduate, Athens University Medical School, 1954; served in Greek Red Cross Hospital; practices as pathology specialist; participated actively in 1955-59 liberation struggle; served as medical doctor in National Guard, 1964-75 and took part in 1964 Tillyria battles; served as president and member of many societies and organizations; member, DISY Larnaca District Committee, DISY Political Committee and Central Council since the party's founding.

Limassol District Deputies

NIKOS ANASTASIADIS: Born in Pera-Pedi [of Limassol], 1946; married, two children; graduate of Pan-Cyprian gymnasium; graduate, Athens University Law School; post-graduate studies at London University graduating with degree in maritime law; practices law; member, League of Limassol City and District Fighters [SAPEL]; member, various societies and organizations; secretary, DISY Limassol District Youth.

AVGERINOS PAPARIS: Born in Pascula of Limassol, 1931; married, three children; graduate, Limassol Commercial Academy; bookstore owner; guerrilla during the 1955-59 liberation struggle and section leader 1963-64; served as assistant organizer of United Party; president and secretary of athletic clubs of Cyprus Soccer Federation and PAAOK [expansion unknown]; member, District Committee and SAPEL treasurer; DIS Limassol district organizer; member, DISY Political Committee and Central Council.

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CSO: 4621/10

PROCEDURE FOR POSSIBLE EC WITHDRAWAL AGREED UPON

Godthaab GRONLANDSPOSTEN in Danish 14 May 81 p 8

[Article: "Denmark and Greenland Agree on Procedure for Withdrawal from EC"]

[Text] "The Danish government would rather see Greenland remain in the EC, but if a majority at the plebiscite in 1982 wishes Greenland to withdraw from the EC we are very much prepared for it and willing in advance to accept the decision. I believe and hope that there will be a majority in the Foketing, as well," says Prime Minister Anker Jorgensen after his meeting in Copenhagen with the Greenland government [Landsstyre] concerning the procedure in the event Greenland withdraws from the EC. The preliminary plan is that if the plebiscite in February 1982, shows a majority for withdrawal, the matter will be presented to the Folketing for decision in the form of proposals for changes in the treaty with the EC. Following the Folketing decision the matter will be presented to the parliaments of the individual EC countries. According to the Prime Minister, a withdrawal would come into effect no earlier than 1 January 1984.

The Government Positive

"The government is clearly prepared to support Greenland in the negotiations that will precede and follow a possible withdrawal, so that the situation of Greenland's people will be as favorable as possible," says Anker Jorgensen. It has been firmly established that the joint nationhood will remain unchanged, regardless of Greenland's future connections with the EC.

However...

"But shall have to add that the Danish government cannot guarantee that after a withdrawal we can solve the problems handled today more or less satisfactorily by means of EC funds for Greenland. I have no right to declare that what is lost through withdrawal will be covered afterward in the name of joint nationhood. We reaffirm, however, that we shall look after Greenland's interests as well as we can after an eventual withdrawal," says the Prime Minister.

Investment Plans Affected

Greenland Minister Tove Linbo Larsen:

"Some estimates have been made of the advantages and disadvantages of EC membership. It is impossible, however, to produce firm figures today. In the Greenland ministry it is our assessment that withdrawal will affect investment plans because some of the EC subsidies go toward those tasks. One cannot say whether these sums can be recovered through fishing licenses or in some other way."

Discussions Appreciated

Jonathan Motzfeldt, head of the Greenlandic government:

"We have appreciated the discussions with the Prime Minister. We realize that withdrawal will raise some economic and juridical problems, resolution of which will require negotiations. One thing is certain, however: If there is a majority in Greenland for withdrawal the government will respect the decision. The Greenland side also regards the common nationhood as untouched by an eventual withdrawal. We therefore think that we, as has always been the case, can enter into negotiations with the Danish government concerning the accomplishment of certain tasks that may become urgent."

New Possibilities Examined

Jonathan Motzfeldt states that the Landsstyre has not committed itself to definitive alternatives in the event of Greenland's withdrawal.

"We shall examine the various alternatives. We are prepared to negotiate fisheries and trade agreements with the EC countries after we withdraw."

More Than the Economy

Anker Jorgensen:

"Even though economic problems will result from a withdrawal, I do not believe they will be of major proportions, and hardly greater than Greenland can handle itself. But neither do I believe that it will primarily be a matter of economic problems. I see Greenland's wish to decide for itself what its relations with the EC should be as a political-psychological desire--an extension of the home rule idea. This must be respected. I understand it very well."

Not only Money

Jonathan Motzfeldt:

"I appreciate that statement by the Prime Minister and I hope that the discussions will continue on that level. To a high degree, Greenland feels able to handle the economic problems resulting from a withdrawal. It should be clear that what we have here is a political-psychological matter, and that therefore we should not merely discuss kroner and ore," concluded Jonathan Motzfeldt.

11,256
CSO: 3107/126

INTELLIGENCE SERVICES FACING DIFFICULT TRANSITION

Paris LE CONTINENT in French 4 Jun 81 p 6

[Article by L. M.: "Difficult Transition Within the French Secret Services"]

[Text] The French intelligence services, the symbol of a regime which are no less very simply the keystone of power because they most frequently function in the shadows, are in turn undergoing a profound change, reflecting the evolution of French political society which is in progress.

Already, just after the election of Francois Mitterrand to the Elysee Palace on 10 May, the next day saw the departure of Alexandre de Marenches, the boss of what is called the "piscine" [lit. "pool" or "fish pond," a nickname]: the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence service (SDECE). Twenty-three years after the birth of the Fifth Republic, the SDECE is not simply changing hands. In fact, the socialists are planning not only to "put the 'piscine' in order" but to "remodel all the intelligence services."

This is something these services truly need, but the transition will not be easy. "Business," settlements of account, complaints, purges and personal or political rivalries characterize the 23 years during which the Gaullist and Giscard regimes attempted to make of the SDECE, the offspring of the French resistance networks born in 1946, the docile tool of the regime in power. They were not always successful.

From the assassination of the progressive leader of the Cameroon, Felix Moumie, in Geneva in 1960, to the arrest last year in Paris of Roger Delpey, the "confidant" of former emperor Bokassa, and including the kidnaping and assassination of the Moroccan opponent Mehdi ben Barka in Paris in 1965, the "pool" has many times been implicated in affairs which were never entirely clarified. Its 2,000 established employees and its innumerable agents had a broad enough area for maneuvering to undertake actions in particular on African soil.

It was in Africa moreover that the work of the SDECE has been most highly valued by the allied secret services and feared by the opponents of the regimes established as a result of the decolonization in the 1960s. The CIA in particular was able to keep up with everything the USSR and Cuba were planning in Angola in 1975, solely thanks to the information provided by the French agents.

The "action" department and the famous "Department 7" of the SDECE have for their part undertaken the most dangerous and spectacular activities: the theft of documents and direct intervention. Something is known about this since the book

"SDECE, Department 7," written by one of the founders of the "piscine," Mr Le Roy-Finville, came out. The service he headed became renowned in Algeria for its activities against traffickers in weapons, and it specialized in breaking and entering, burglarizing safes and opening diplomatic pouches to obtain and microfilm documents deemed important for the understanding of the policies of other countries.

But since the publication of this book, a number of agents have complained of the new difficulties they face in recruiting, notably among the navigational personnel of airline and shipping companies.

But long before that, other problems had developed. The appointment of Mr de Marenches as head of the SDECE in 1980 followed close upon the long "Ben Barka affair," as well as the largest of the purges: more than 900 agents were dismissed, in part because of their socialist leanings. Department 7 was shelved temporarily because of its involvement in the kidnaping of Ben Barka, and then reorganized and even strengthened.

Since 1974 (when Giscard d'Estaing was elected), the change in the regime brought about a slow and difficult "Giscard modernization" of the pool, punctuated by the settlement of accounts between the old guard (Gaullists) and the new generation (Giscard supporters), while there were those who profited from the situation to execute their own "coups." This was the case in particular with the famous Bob Denard, who after having failed entirely in the "raid on Cotonou" in December 1977, succeeded with the raid on Moroni (in 1978) ousting (and killing?) President Ali Soihli, and replacing him with Ahmed Abdallah. More generally, the work of the SDECE agents in Africa was hindered from time to time by the "boss," de Marenches, whom some charge with ignoring the intelligence relayed by the agents in the field, above all when it did not coincide with his own views.

This, in their eyes, explains the blunders committed in Central Africa, Chad and Zaire, where the personal interests of former president Giscard d'Estaing did not always jibe either with the foreign policy guidelines of the government or with the intelligence gathered on the spot.

The new president, Francois Mitterrand, who has not followed the problems pertaining to intelligence closely, did not appoint Francois de Crossouvre, a member of the defense commission of the PS [Socialist Party] to head the SDECE, as everyone expected he would. The future boss of the secret services will in any case be able to profit from the advice of three "experts": a diplomat with long service in Africa (Pierre Dabezies), Admiral Antoine Sanguinetti, and above all, Colonel Passy, who headed the forerunner of the SDECE, the DGER. What is already being called the "socialist pool" depends on them.

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DEBRAY ON EXTREMISM, LEFTWING, PCF, ECONOMIC CRISIS

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 30-31 May 81 p 4

[Interview with Régis Debray by Merete Soussan and Peter Wivel]

[Text] INFORMATION correspondents interview Régis Debray, just appointed President Mitterrand's foreign policy adviser, on the significance of the French presidential election for Europe, on the rôle of the intellectual, on democracy, and on the necessity of recognizing that socialism has no models.

Paris, May--Régis Debray, 41, friend of many of the big revolutionary figures of Latin America, Fidel Castro, Salvador Allende, "Che" Guevara, author of a number of important works in modern political philosophy, has been invited to be François Mitterrand's political adviser at the Elysée.

Debray, by his own definition, is no *"personality,"* but a person, a human being, who when all is said and done remains true to what he really is, to his true nature, and refuses to go for the ideal picture others may have created of him.

He is the prodigal son who returns home, who falls to the temptation history offers him: to be a part of the building of socialism in the country he knows best, because he was reared there. A man who has made up his mind to acknowledge his heritage and his obligations.

Régis Debray has experienced a great deal. As a 20-year-old he went to revolutionary Cuba, and later to other countries on the Latin American continent. He taught philosophy at the University of Havana, and in January 1967 he published his first book, "Revolution in the Revolution?" about the experiences of the Latin American guerrillas.

A few months later the Bolivian security forces hunting for the legendary "Che" arrested Debray, who was sentenced in October 1967 to 30 years in prison. The sentence coincided with the report that Debray's friend "Che" had been found in the Bolivian jungle and murdered.

Debray was released in 1970 and expelled to Chile, where Salvador Allende had just come into power. There he compiled the book "Conversations With Allende," Fremad, 1972. But Allende's dramatic death in 1973 and the Latin American guerrillas'

many defeats started Debray on a comprehensive work analyzing armed revolution in Latin America.

Self-Search

The disappointments gave Debray occasion for a self-search, which he has minted partly into belles-lettres and partly into strongly personal reflections on being "a petit bourgeois between two fires and within the four walls of prison," as the titles of his books dating from 1976 run.

Last year he published the work "Skriveren" [The Writer], which is a very comprehensive showdown with the anti-intellectual side of Marxism (discussed in INFORMATION, 21-22 June 1980). He will follow up the analysis this fall with a book on political philosophy.

We meet Debray in his office, overflowing with books, in a small apartment on the Rue de Seine, on the left bank. He is visibly nervous, because immediately after the interview he is to go to the Rue de Bièvre, where the newly elected president of France is expecting him for lunch.

Hour of Truth

"The election of François Mitterrand is probably the hour of truth: after 23 years in the opposition, the leftist opposition is facing its political responsibilities," says Régis Debray. "In that sense it is now that the difficulties begin. But it is a change not only for the left wing but for all of France. And perhaps indirectly for Europe as well."

[Question] How?

[Answer] Politically this means not only a change in society. I should also call it a return to democracy, i.e. to the alternative. This means a reconstruction, an enormous hope for all that part of the country that has been excluded from political influence for a quarter of a century.

That did not result in disorders. You have noticed that people are quiet, that all the right wing's assertions about an apocalypse have been put to shame. People are contented and quiet; that is the way it is!

[Question] What does the election mean in international terms?

[Answer] It is a moral encouragement to all progressive forces and all popular forces all over the world. But it is too early to say anything about how it will make itself felt. At the moment there is nothing more than an expectation, a hope.

Diffusion of Power

[Question] But the election does mean a softening of the cold war front that has been developing.

[Answer] Yes, quite definitely. In recent years there has been an impression that a manysided world has become two-sided--east and west. And I believe that the election of François Mitterrand can favor a diffusion of the decision-making

centers in the world, i.e. it can break the polarization between Washington and Moscow and give new weight to powers in between. That is the way we shall go.

[Question] A Soviet invasion can change the picture again...

[Answer] It will be the end of détente, yes. It means the breaking off of all economic relations with the Soviet Union, but I do not believe that the Soviet Union would get any advantage from destroying all bridges to the Western World, since the country is still strongly dependent on western technology. I really believe that a Soviet intervention in Poland will be a catastrophe for the Poles first of all, but also for the Russians and for the whole world.

[Question] The left wing in Europe has long been without influence, and in certain places that has had violent manifestations.

[Answer] Each national situation has its own logic, but the election of François Mitterrand has shown that the left wing can win power by democratic, legal, peaceful means. I believe that is an important experience for Italy and Spain, even though we must remember, of course, that control of the exercise of power is not possession of all power.

But you were alluding to terrorism?

[Question] Yes.

Terrorism

[Answer] Remember, there are apparently two forms of terrorism. There is a more nationalistic terrorism, which does have a cultural, ethnic, national basis. I am referring to such groups as ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty Group] in Spain or the Irish IRA.

I do not believe that they have anything whatever to do with the left wing.

And then there are groups like the Red Brigades in Italy, the Red Army Faction in the FRG, etc., which have nothing to do with the left wing, either, even though they talk a left-wing language.

It is obvious that not only is that not the way--everybody knows that--but terrorism is the greatest obstacle to the leftist forces' success in countries where democratic rights are respected, as e.g. in Italy or even in the FRG.

Therefore, if these groups were really conscious leftist groups, they would quiet down. But since they neither belong to the left wing nor are conscious, they do not quiet down.

Luxury Phenomenon

[Question] With your revolutionary past in Latin America, you have often been an example of precisely that leftist extremism.

[Answer] I have never been a part of the European leftist extremism. For me there has never been any similarity, any connection between the anti-imperialist

and antifascist resistance struggle in Latin America and the European left that calls itself Maoist, Guevarist, Trotskist, etc.

To me these are two widely different worlds.

I support the former, i.e. the Third World's anti-imperialist movement. But I have never felt that the European leftist extremism was genuine. It appears to me to be a movement without historical perspectives. It verges on being a genuine luxury phenomenon in the problem-free profit society. It has rather to do with a marginalization of certain intellectual circles.

It is the expression of a certain intellectual avant-garde's break with the masses, with the people, a break that is due to its having no roots in the people. Terrorism is a part of West Europe's intellectual folklore; it does not interest me very much.

The Intelligentsia

[Question] But you often express the view that precisely the intellectual has a special part to play in democracy.

[Answer] It is true that as soon as the left wing is in a position of strength there is a renewed flowering of the intellectual life. But the matter is more complicated today. For the French intelligentsia was completely surprised by Mitterrand's victory.

It may be said that the dominant intelligentsia did not take part in the election campaign. It did not join Mitterrand's campaign, being either suspicious of it or indifferent to it. There has actually been something like a real break between the intellectual part of the country and the socialist part.

To put it another way, there is a little world in Paris, the newspapers, the magazines, the research institutes, the theoretical journals, that has been completely swallowed up by anti-Marxist polemics, etc., and that did not notice at all the popular movement, which is a fundamentally provincial movement, that brought Mitterrand to the president's post.

And quite contrary to what one might believe, I think that a certain intellectual elite will be excluded from power, so to speak, because it is the masses that have taken the floor.

The intelligentsia has had a monopoly on debate; it has been marked by a few editorial writers', a few "big intellectuals'" controversies. But as soon as the rank and file begin to express themselves, as soon as the class conflict becomes sharper, the intellectuals will lose much of their credibility and many of their supporters.

But there will still be an intellectual renewal. But that renewal will take place at the cost of the collapse of certain intellectual habits.

The Communist Party

[Question] Will the French Communist Party play a part in this?

[Answer] The French Communist Party no longer has the intellectual leadership. In fact, it may be said that practically speaking it no longer has intellectuals at its disposal. It is anti-intellectual of necessity, for since it no longer has many intellectuals, it has been compelled to go back to a working-class base.

But if the French intellectuals in general have deserted the Communist Party in recent decades, they did not act in isolation. They were reacting to a mass flight carried out by the workers themselves.

When the intellectuals desert a party, that means that the workers also leave. And I believe that the Communist Party's present decline and defeat was in a certain sense anticipated and foretold by its defeat and its decline in the intellectual milieu.

The Decline

I am not just talking about what I call the high intelligence of the capital. I am talking about all the intellectual workers, who can no longer recognize their old party. It is a party that had theoretical journals, which it hardly has any more, that had newspapers, which it hardly has any more, and that had philosophical and historical research groups, which it hardly has any more.

In short, the Communist Party has experienced a flight of intellectuals. It is sad, but it is a fact. So it will hardly play any part in the debate. And they are not taking part in the ideological debate at the moment, either.

[Question] Will this decline continue?

[Answer] I do not know. But historically it seems to me that unless the Communist Party changes direction and leadership, yes, it will continue. If it continues in its outdated and unattractive Stalinism, that can only hasten the decline.

The party has need of a very bold policy within the framework of the Eurocommunism of the surrounding countries, to slow down its decline or come out of it. Its policy is really disjointed and almost suicidal.

[Question] The European leftist movements also seem to be gradually turning away more and more from earlier communist models.

[Answer] Absolutely. That is very clear.

No Models

[Question] What consequences will that have?

[Answer] A socialist model will be constructed that is adapted to the developed countries, the industrial countries, which possess a democratic tradition. Today the so-called socialist countries have ceased to be lodestars, frames of reference. They have practically become bogeys to the entire West, and here I am speaking about the working class in the West, too.

That is a fact. So we must begin from the beginning. There are no longer any models, no longer any myths, no longer any socialist paradises, and it will be that way for the next decade.

that is not the fault of the paradises. It is the fault of the people who are looking for a paradise. Those countries have done what they could, considering their backward past.

It is the European intellectuals who have projected their fantasies across to faraway countries, and now all of a sudden have discovered the truth. This truth is deceptive, because they created illusions for themselves about it earlier.

But to put it another way, it is just as much a collapse of the Western dream as a collapse of Eastern socialism. Therefore the criticism of the existing socialism should be accompanied by a self-criticism.

National Reality

[Question] Then there is no ready-made socialism?

[Answer] Definitely not. There is no model at all. I believe one must simply start without a model, and that the process itself will reveal original forms that were unforeseeable and must be suited to the individual national reality.

But you must know that here it is not a matter of a transition to socialism. Here in France we have a democratic process, a return to a real democracy in information, nationalizations of industries, and economic course. There is no question of carrying out a revolution. That is not at all the objective of the present transitional government.

[Question] Can it be said that a new socialist democracy is developing in Europe?

[Answer] I do not believe that there is one left wing; I do not believe there is one Europe. There are many Europes. First of all there is a Northern Europe and a Southern Europe. What is necessary for Southern Europe has nothing to do with Northern Europe, or e.g., with a country like Denmark.

Nor is it one left wing, either; there are many left wings. There is a socialist left and a social democratic left. Even within the French Socialist Party there are trends, currents, different groups of concepts. So it is in the communist parties as well. There are communist parties that do not resemble each other.

Universality

So it is very difficult to draw a general line of development. Remember, there is no recipe for how to make a society, not even for how to promote democracy.

Democracy, I believe, is always the possibility of an alternative, always the possibility of a change and a discussion of earlier choices against the background of experience gained. Democracy is simply a check by the governed on the governing.

There are countries where that check is impossible, and they are not democratic countries. This means that Poland perhaps can become a democratic country, because the governed are attempting to regain control over the governing.

To me it is always necessary to know one's country to the bottom, its history, its culture, its mentality, and to work within conditions that really exist. And especially to stop believing that it is possible to import ready-made models.

let me express it briefly this way] Socialism is not an import-export business.

Crisis Trends

[Question] Until Mitterrand's election the West seems to have been moving toward the right. Why?

[Answer] That is normal in an economic crisis situation. Quite contrary to a certain Marxist line of economic thought, economic crisis favors the forces of the counterrevolution much more than those of the revolution. Take 1929. The socialist revolution did not arise from the economic crisis. What did arise was nazism and World War II.

It is normal that crisis finds expression in certain reflexes, in faith, in the search for national and material security, in a kind of search into one's self. It is also normal that in a time of decline, when resources are scanty, the state and the state machinery cannot make the welfare state work as before.

It is therefore normal to seek the solution in a return to pure liberalism, and for crisis to create panic. That is a probable but not a fateful process. The proof is in France, where we reacted differently.

[Question] But the crisis has not yet been overcome.

[Answer] No, but let us see. It may be that the socialist solution, which lies in reviving demand and hence the economy, may prove better than the depression solution that the right wing put into practice and that failed in France. We shall have the answer in perhaps a year's time.

But what is certain is that the Barre plan was a fiasco, that we had 400,000 unemployed in 1974 and now we have 1.8 million, that inflation is still about 14 percent a year. Giscard d'Estaing's policy had no prospect of improving the situation; on the contrary. It will therefore be changed.

The Parliamentary Election

[Question] Will Mitterrand get a majority in the new parliament?

[Answer] Yes, I believe so.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Because the legitimacy, the established order, has changed sides. It is a question of logic. The French know that Mitterrand cannot put his policy through if they do not give him the political means to do so, i.e. a parliamentary majority that can pass the laws the government recommends.

It would be illogical for the French to elect a president and then disavow him a month later. Nor has that happened before.

Moreover, I believe that certain population groups, including the elderly, who vote for the established order on principle--and the established order is the left wing's--will feel obligated to vote left.

In the third place I believe that the new government, in a month or 6 weeks, has had a chance to propose important reforms in many fields, minimum wage, retirement, in the basic social fields in general, which will convince the skeptical that this government really means to change things.

As far as I am concerned, I am confident.

DEBRAY APPOINTMENT: SOCIALIST CONCERN FOR THIRD WORLD

Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Jun 81 p 10

[Article by Marcel Niedergang: "Mr Regis Debray--from the Bolivian Partisans to Socialist Humanism"]

[Text] The official appointment of Mr Regis Debray to the position of head of mission attached to the Secretariat-General of the Office of the President of the Republic undoubtedly will revive a controversy which is already widely underway in France and abroad. The announcement of his probable entry into Elysee Palace alone has already triggered bitter-sweet commentaries in the press and murmurs of astonishment in certain foreign offices. There have also been some accusations: Mr Debray fought with the Uruguayan Tupamaros movement, as he said and wrote in recent days.

His close associates will not be astonished that the chief of state backed up Mr Debray, a personal friend, who since 1975 has accompanied him on several of his journeys to Latin America, particularly to Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, and Costa Rica. The adversaries of the author of "Revolution dans las revolution" [Revolution Within a Revolution] will raise a howl of protest and point the finger at the former supporter of the idea of the guerrilla "center" and the man who had joined "Che" Guevara in the mountains of Bolivia.

The conflicting passions raised by Mr Regis Debray are quite in keeping with a passionate and tormented personality. A graduate of the teacher training college, with a degree in philosophy, a former member of the UEO (Communist Student Union), a disciple of Althusser, a distinguished writer and essayist, Mr Debray is a brilliant intellectual although he still defends himself against that with energy and happily takes swipes at the left-wing writers and intelligentsia. He is completely geared toward action, toward political and human commitment, and one must admit that he paid dearly for that passion which consumed him for 3 years in prison at Camiri, in the eastern part of Bolivia. His entire personal and political record can be explained by this difficult alternation between thought and action.

He was a passionate supporter of Cuba at a time when the Cuban experience was indeed passion-arousing. He participated in the fighting of the Venezuelan revolutionaries in the most bitter clash between the Democratic Action Party of Mr Romulo Betancourt and the extreme left-wing movements which were looking to Havana. He wanted to joint and accompany "Che" Guevara at a moment when Guevaraism and the armed struggle in effect looked like a "possible solution" in Latin America. In

Bolivia, he was a political prisoner defended by an exceptional movement of international solidarity. But he would never have been released if the brief democratic interlude of Gen Juan Jose Torres at La Paz had not, in the nick of time, permitted him to find refuge in Chile.

Having become the personal friend of Salvador Allende in Santiago, he supported the Chilean reformist socialist experiment which was under attack from the inside and the outside. Returning to France, he engaged in his own self-criticism as a philosopher of the armed struggle and joined the Socialist Party. But it is the image of Mr Debray, the friend of armed struggle movements, which remains strongest in many Latin American circles.

Joining a European Left which is more humanist than revolutionary, not denying his solidarity with the people's liberation movements in Central America and elsewhere, but clearly dissociating himself from armed terrorist movements, he has in recent years been involved in the struggle in support of human rights. His presence in Elysee Palace confirms the growing interest of Mr Francois Mitterrand in Latin America in particular (Mrs Allende, widow of the assassinated Chilean president, was at his right hand during the first official luncheon at Elysee Palace) and for the Third World in general. But that presence also entails the risk of further aggravating the questions and reservations raised in Washington or Bonn. It could promote the debate on the first contradictions detected within the new French leadership team.

Mr Regis Debray is 40 years old, a graduate of the Ecole normale superieure, with a degree in philosophy; in Bolivia he went along with guerrilla leader Ernesto 'Che' Guevara. Imprisoned at Camiri from 1967 until 1970, he went to Chile where he very closely observed the Popular Unity experiement of Salvador Allende. Upon his return to France, Mr Debray--whose sympathies at first had been with the French Communist Party--moved closer to the Socialist Party which he joined in 1974. He was a member of the Research Committee on Freedoms established by Mr Francois Mitterrand in May 1975.

In 1977 he won the Femina prize for "La neige brule" [The Snow Burns], an award whose prize money he offered to the Revolutionary Communist League. He went to Nicaragua after the victory of the Sandinista Front in July 1979. Author of "Revolution dans la revolution" [Maspero Publishers, 1969), Mr Debray published several other political essays, the lastest being entitled "le Pouvoir intellectuel en France" [Intellectual Power in France], "le Scribe" [The Writer], and "Naissance du politique" [The Birth of Politics].

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DEBRAY'S VIEWS ON LATIN AMERICA DESCRIBED AS OUTDATED

Bogota EL SIGLO in Spanish 6 Jun 80 p 5

[Editorial: "The Challenge of Debray"]

[Text] One of the most disconcerting events in international politics in recent days, and which is a strange regression, is the possible appointment of Regis Debray, former guerrilla in Latin America and theoretician of the far left, as adviser on Latin American affairs to the new French president.

In addition to being an open challenge to the consolidation of peace in our hemisphere, after the majority of our countries have managed to overcome the coordinated activities of the guerrillas during the last two decades, the appointment has an inescapable contemptuous flavor. It presumes that Latin America is a continent with a single dimension, where the guerrilla is the only appropriate factor for understanding the political nature of our countries. By this it leaves to one side a broader perception of the industrial and manufacturing progress of the dissimilar nations of this continent, something which is obviously a great anachronism.

The Latin America of the young guerrilla Debray has few links in common with the present situation of the continent. It has changed rapidly, in keeping with the times and today occupies one of the privileged positions in the developing world because of the potential of its raw materials and industrial products. From a backward agricultural society resulting from the ill-fated effects of agrarian reformism, many nations have managed to recover, countries such as Brazil and Argentina, until they have become advanced in agricultural matters. Social, labor and political relations existing in our continent are better and more sophisticated today than 15 years ago and many of them are incomprehensible to the "intelligenza" of the European left, accustomed to measuring their level of discontent with parameters which are different than ours. In the allegedly intellectual European and North American criticism of Latin nations, there has always been the unbearable germ of cultural imperialism, which is what reveals in all its magnitude the incomprehension of what the most educated foreign mentality is capable when it is a matter of perceiving and analyzing the predominant phenomenons in our society.

In addition to these general reflections on the irreconcilable distances between the Latin spirit and the heavy European intellectualism, there are other considerations of a political nature around the possible appointment of Debray. In the past years, during the government of Mr Carter, relations between Latin America and the United States fell to a level without precedents. From the North American administration there was allowed, and on occasions encouraged, the most gigantic and destructive political penetration of communism in these lands, and during that 4-year period, Cuba broadened its field of influence greatly, managing to establish a forward post in Central America and another in Granada near the South American coast. It was there where the balance between the powers in this hemisphere was upset and the seeds were sown for a universal conflict between the two powers, a situation from which we Americans should have extracted outselves because we do not play an active role in that confrontation of interests.

The decline of relations with North America was supported for a brief period on the possibility of an opening of the European nations toward Latin America, they being aware that someone should fill the vacuum being left by the suspicious American disinterest. Our relations with Germany, Spain and France have, therefore, been increased substantially in recent years, particularly with France, which is a prototype country of the Latin race, and there has begun to exist what Ambassador Enrique Gomez calls "a mutual rediscovery." This is based, of course, on urgent and pragmatic questions: cultural, trade and technical exchange, questions which are of mutual advantage to France and Colombia and which in the future could deteriorate due to the aggressive political concept of international relations that will surely be a part of the program of Mr Debray.

Mitterand begins his government, therefore, with a misstep in international matters, similar to the many, which with a great show of irresponsibility were taken by Mr Andrew Young during the first years of the Carter Administration. Whoever remembers the regressive effect the repeated public statements by Young had on peace in the continent and the world can understand why the prospect of a political regression now with Debray as its leader is not very encouraging for Latin America. In our country he will find a prewarned and adverse climate and as of now the appointment will create a threatening tension, which is not the proper climate for an improvement in diplomatic relations.

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SOCIALIST POLICY, ARMS SALE FOR LATIN AMERICA

Rio de Janeiro JORNAL DO BRASIL in Portuguese 7 Aug 80 p 12

[Interview with Antoine Blanca, PSF representative to the Socialist International, PSF specialist on Latin America and adviser to Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy, by Arlette Chabrol of JORNAL DO BRASIL; date not established]

[Text] Paris--The policy of the new French Government toward Latin America will not be markedly/of the left/ [in boldface] as could be expected from the positions assumed by the French Socialist Party [PSF] when it was the opposition. "There should be no confusion between the Socialist Party and the Government of France," insists Antoine Blance, Socialist Party representative to the Socialist International, adviser to Prime Minister Pierre Mauroy and a party specialist on Latin America.

"Our president and our government are realistic: Brazil is a nation with which it is desirable to have the closest and most profound relations possible," declares Blanca. "It is another thing with respect to the Socialist Party. As far as the party is concerned, we only have bonds with friendly parties, which are now in the opposition (he cited the PMDB and the PT [Brazilian Democratic Movement Party and the Workers Party, respectively]."

However, the example of relations with Chile is even better. Francois Mitterand announced in 1974 that he would break relations with Santiago if he were elected. Now, finally in the Presidency, the policy has changed, since the Chilean government is consolidated and the interests of the French companies in Chile such as Citroen, Renault and Thomson cannot be ignored.

"In certain countries with dictatorships, it is better to have ambassadors who are aware, vigorous and true democrats than to have no ambassador," says Blanca.

A sign of the movement /to the center/ [in boldface] by the Socialist Party in power is that in January socialist politicians refused to attend a reception for President Figueiredo in Paris. Now Blanca admits that "Brazil is returning to a life of democracy" and denies that Mitterand intends to condition the sale of arms to Brazil to the political situation of the country.

The son of a Spanish refugee, a militant socialist for 28 years, in charge of studies on Latin America in the Socialist Party since its foundation in 1971, Blanca also defends the appointment of his friend, the former guerrilla Regis Debray, as adviser to the General Secretariat of the Presidency on Latin American affairs.

He is another man.

[Question] Up to now the PS has had relations with opposition parties in Brazil. However, the new socialist leaders are in the government and as such must deal with the authorities of Brasilia. How do you view that question?

[Answer] There should not be any confusion between the Socialist Party and the Government of France. This must be made clear. I say that there must be a good example of the difference between the role of a party such as ours and the role of that party in government. Brazil would be a prime example.

Brazil is a country of 120 million inhabitants. It is the largest in Latin America. We all believe that it will have a great future, regardless of the economic and social difficulties of the moment. Its importance exceeds by far the frontiers of the American region because it has an undeniable role in the Atlantic region, particularly in Africa. Brazil is, therefore, a reality which no government worthy of the name can refrain from taking into consideration. Our president and our government are realists: Brazil is a nation with which it is desirable to have the closest and most profound relations possible; relations at all levels, cultural and economic.

It is another thing with respect to the Socialist Party. As far as the party is concerned, we only have relations with friendly parties now in the opposition. This is within a feeling of mutual respect for our idiosyncracies. I clarify that it does not say only with "fraternal parties," because these are the member parties of the Socialist International and none of them exist in Brazil. We are, therefore, in a very comfortable position in speaking of our relations with them. No one will be able to say to us that we have special bonds, that in the situation in which we find ourselves, in government, those bonds could influence or help those parties.

[Question] Could you explain with which parties the Socialist Party maintains relations?

[Answer] Unfortunately they are very numerous. I say unfortunately because that proves that on that point there was no definition by us or by them. We have had permanent relations for many years with the MDB [Brazilian Democratic Movement], which became the PMDB. They are, however, informal because the PMDB does not have organized international relations. They take place specifically because of the visits by legislators. We think that it is interesting to have relations with the PT since it represents an entire category of Brazilian workers. As you can see, we have enough eclecticism in our relations with the Brazilian worker movement which we also follow closely.

[Question] What do you think about the attempts at merging several parties of the opposition in Brazil?

[Answer] That is a problem of the Brazilians. What I can say is that providing that such a union is accomplished and it is lasting and it benefits the forces of change and democracy, we are automatically in favor of it. We in the Socialist Party are ourselves the result of a great and long process of unification. We know that it is not an easy task and that it requires personal self-sacrifice. However, I believe that democracy is also simplification, with the condition that it not be artificial and that it respect the factions of ideas. Much wisdom is required to reach that stage.

[Question] You are not unaware that the question of nationalizations and their possible consequences abroad is causing great unease in some Brazilian circles?

[Answer] I followed that campaign published by the Brazilian press. I must say that another part of the press dealt with that problem with much greater objectivity. Did the fact that Credit Lyonnais and the Banque Nationale de Paris have been nationalized banks since 1945 create any problems for the operations of Brazilian affiliates and companies with them? Were there some obstacles in working with Renault, another nationalized company? I do not see why the nationalization of large French monopolizing companies of some economic sectors should threaten harm to cooperation with Brazilian companies.

[Question] Do you believe, then, that it does not affect the lives of Brazilian affiliates of French companies which are going to be nationalized?

[Answer] I not only believe that it will not affect them but I believe that the public interest character of those companies will be accented. I take advantage of this occasion to reiterate that one of the basic decisions of the Mitterand Government is that of turning more toward the Third World.

[Question] The unions always protested against the installation of French companies in countries where labor is cheaper, aggravating unemployment in France. Did you take some measure in that respect?

[Answer] I am convinced that we will not touch that which exists abroad. I have already said we are realists. Our willingness to work with countries such as Brazil will be done on the basis of mutual agreements based on reciprocal interest. We have no intention of abandoning either the French workers or interests. However, we also want to contribute to the advancement of developing countries on the level of technology and their capacity for self-production.

[Question] Specifically, will the wages in Brazilian affiliates of French companies be increased?

[Answer] We already have difficulties in accomplishing our own program in France, but we shall get there. We do not believe that by a simple magical wave of the hand the workers of the entire world who work in companies with French participation would have their conditions improved.

[Question] During the electoral campaign Francois Mitterand declared that France would halt its arms sales to racist and fascist regimes. It seems that it was specifically aimed at Latin America. Would Brazil be included?

[Answer] Not that I know of. Brazil returned to the path of democracy, to a path it chose freely, with the 1982 general elections. We do not want to interfere in that travel or to commit blackmail of the type that "We shall sell arms with the condition that..." We see that your rules--the creation of political parties and the promise of an electoral timetable--are acceptable. And we are following everything with great interest. We do not say, as the previous regime did, that we have state to state relationships. We also judge regimes morally.

[Question] In January, during the official visit by President Figueiredo to France, socialist politicians of Paris refused to attend a reception in the Prefecture as a sign of protest against the visit of the chief of state of a country which they believe is not democratic.

[Answer] We never considered the Brazilian regime an example that should be followed, that is true. At that time the Paris politicians adopted that attitude taking into account the somewhat provoking ostentation which honored the regime more than it did Brazil itself. However, it is necessary to point out that at any rate we shall not justify our government relations by keeping score on each country.

[Question] Returning to the sale of arms, are some Latin American countries targeted? There is much talk about Chile.

[Answer] I will resort to an old maxim dating from the beginning of socialism, which says: It is necessary to go for the ideal and to understand the real. Therefore, we also have to face reality. France--and all members of the government never stop repeating it--will respect already signed agreements. We will not tear up contracts France has already signed. We also have to take into consideration the interests of our armaments industry. What we do say is that we do not want the great international mission of France to be the sale of arms and its great honor to be that of being the third greatest world exporter of arms. We do not want to have a completely immoral conduct in the area of arms sales, for example, like France regularly had when it was governed by the right: The sale of arms to two enemy countries so that they could both fight with the same Mirage aircraft or the same AMX tanks.

I believe however, that we should sell arms to Nicaragua so that it may defend itself. The country is threatened by Somoza followers in Honduras, who number some 3,000 to 5,000 armed and trained men. It is intended to cause hunger in

Nicaragua by halting sales of wheat, [illegible]ring off all credit. What should be done is to help the defense of the pluralist democracy they are attempting to install in the country.

[Question] There is a point that is not very clear: Will France break its diplomatic relations with Chile? Yes or no?

[Answer] Francois Mitterand announced that he would do so in 1974. However, the situation at that time was not the same as today. It was only one year after the murder of Salvador Allende and the decision was in the manner of an example. The break in diplomatic relations can also be conceived as an example. We are not going to begin to break with all dictatorial regimes. What is true, however, is that French relations with Chile are going to be changed. They will no longer be viewed with benevolence. Certainly the contrary will happen. However, the Chilean regime is consolidated. We have interests; there are many French companies in the country (Citroen, Renault and Thomsom). Those are the realities that count.

[Question] The appointment of Regis Debray as adviser to the Elysee Secretariat General was very poorly received abroad, particularly in Latin America. Will he have a decisive role in French policy for Latin America?

[Answer] Regis Debray has no executive powers. He is an adviser, and what is important, he will help the president of the republic with his experience. He was chosen by Francois Mitterand because he is his friend. But when Claude Cheysson, the new minister of foreign affairs becomes known, it will be easily seen that he would not accept a dictated policy. He is not a puppet.

However, I would be careful to do justice to Regis Debray, the leader of many persons imprisoned in 1967, and to the drama of that courageous youngster who put his convictions to the test by going to fight in Bolivia. Regis Debray today is a man, a great intellectual. And it must not be forgotten that this man of conviction and determination wrote "A Criticism of Arms." Regis Debray was already different in Chile in 1970 when he supported the brave reforms of Allende. He became still another man after his return to France as an adviser to Francois Mitterand. In any case, because I was always with Debray, I am in a position to state that he knows all the realities of Latin America.

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CSO: 3101/90

OVERVIEW OF PSI-PSDI RELATIONS

Central Committees in Confrontation

Rome L'UMANITA in Italian 3 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Gianni Finocchiaro: "PSI and PSDI Central Committees Facing Each Other"]

[Text] I hesitated for a long time before writing these comments on the 7 and 8 May PSDI [Independent Social Democratic Party] Central Committee meeting. But in the end, a related reference to an article published several months ago in the magazine ALLEANZA prevailed; in that article I agreed with Antonio Casanova regarding the mistake made by the socialists in either of these parties, the mistake of often leaving their history, their political contributions, their elaborations, and sometimes perhaps also their pre-eminence to be discovered by scholars, rather than to put them to use in the context of contemporary reality. This is quite in contrast to the Catholics and the communists who, instead, even collect the relics of their political chronicles.

In line with these considerations, I would like to extract, from the notes of these past 2 days of political speeches we heard, some elements which appeared to be new and interesting to anyone who, like myself, has intensely experienced the internal life of the other socialist party, participating for many, many years in all of the meetings of the PSI Central Committee.

Before I go any further I would like to say that, in presenting these notes, I do not in the least intend to get into a bitter argument with the comrades in the PSI from whom I dissociated myself with sadness, keeping intact all of the relationships of affection built in the course of a long militancy; nor do I want to stress negative aspects in the meetings of their Central Committee. On the contrary, I want to pin down the political themes, the practical operating procedures, the style, and finally the culture (something which is certainly more difficult) of the central committees of both parties, starting with the observation that, contrary to the conviction prevailing within the PSI, the leading cadres and, I also believe, the social-democratic militants, belong to the same human material which expresses itself with extraordinary similarity, which is beyond suspicion, regarding ideological principles, the analysis of events, and the political prospects facing Italian socialism.

This was the impression that was constantly in my mind during those 2 days of hard work on the part of the PSDI Central Committee--which I attended, naturally for the

first time--to such an extent as to strengthen all of the melancholy considerations which a socialist can entertain from 1944 until today regarding the uselessness of an organizational division which still exists and which perhaps will exist for some time to come. I naturally want to add, almost as a justification of our mistakes, the enormous difficulty of ridding ourselves of the tremendous weight of the political forces--especially the communists and Christian-democrats--that are interested in the permanent socialist diaspora which has been a burden and which--why not?--is still a burden on both parties, creating reciprocal estrangement and lack of interest among each other.

The Long Defamation

This meeting of the PSDI Central Committee certainly was quite exceptional in view of the very reason behind its convening which primarily was to come up with a situation estimate, a judgment, and a response to the 42nd PSI Congress. This is why it jumped into the immediate political situation with both feet in order to project itself into what we might call the "socialist question." In other words, the question of the ideological and political unity of reformist socialism which, during the last PSI Congress, signified, if not a triumph, then at least enormous relevance, more than it had ever had before in the course of the past 35 years of political life.

One of the recurring considerations, in listening to the speeches in the Central Committee, was what--talking to some comrades--I defined as the "long-drawn-out defamation." Let me explain what I mean: In seeking to answer the question which comes up every so often, the Italian socialists and social-democrats confront each other. Here it is: What is the basic political opinion which the average militant in the PSI has regarding the PSDI as a whole, its leadership groups, and its militants? Naturally, I am not talking about opinions based on mutual personal or political knowledge but about the overall political-ideological judgment which has its roots in the recent history of the Italian socialist movement, a history which, starting with unity at the time of Liberation, veered apart in the course of 30 years of separation, from Barberini Palace until now.

Although he accepted the European turn of the party, by virtue of the truth that came out during the early seventies (I would say even that this was the most conspicuous heritage left by the PSDI to the PSI, after the failure of unification), with the subsequent rediscovery and reevaluation of European democratic socialism, the PSI militant today still feels that he must make the point that his respect and solidarity for European social democracy does not imply an equal attitude or an equal judgment regarding the Italian social-democrats. This is as if they were entirely different from those in the other European countries or, worse still, as if they really belonged to the right wing of the Italian political spectrum. Besides, it is not difficult to discover the underlying reasons of this judgment, which is partly superficial and partly sectarian, if we divide relationships between the PSI and the PSDI into two periods. The first one extends from the split at Barberini Palace up to unification in 1966; the second one runs from 1969 until today.

During the first period, this development was greatly influenced by the ideological and of course also political hegemony exercised by the communists over the PSI where

one of the fundamental elements was the continuation of the ruthless communist aggression against democratic socialism which, starting with the split in 1921, with the brief hiatus represented by the period of the popular fronts and World War II, was resumed with extreme virulence after the establishment of the Cominform and all the way to the Khrushchevian epoch. During the second period, this development was influenced by the difficult coexistence during 3 years of socialist unification which we must remember for at least the successive 2 or 3 years in the PSI to exorcise the "corruption which power had brought also into the ranks of the PSI"; in spite of this, Nenni himself came to define the PSI at the end of the seventies as "the party of advisors," without ever attributing such a condition to the 3 years when the party was unified. And this happened in spite of the fact that the 1969 split caused less animosity among the militants of either party than in 1947, if for no other reasons because many militants coming from the PSDI stuck with the PSI (whom, to tell the truth, equality without reservation was granted) and since many others from the PSI preferred to follow the PSDI. In spite of some marginal attempt to define the policy of the PSDI after 1969 as "reactionary and extreme right-wing," the division did not bring about that series of rancors which constitutes the inevitable outcome of any split.

This is a phenomenon which must not be underestimated because, in my modest opinion, this has caused the political-ideological substance and, in a certain sense, the political personnel of the two parties to become much more intercommunicating than the leadership groups and middle-level cadres of either party would wish to admit. In an attempt to simplify this situation as much as possible, we might in substance say that, standing firm in 1966, the two parties during the early seventies, although ready for a fight and for dispute, turned out to be much closer to a "quid" which we could also define as the "anvil of socialism as a whole" within the Italian socialist movement.

The Anvil of PSDI Socialism and the Neoreformism of the PSI

Now, even if we confine ourselves to a reading of the minutes published by L'UMANITA --although realizing that, by their very nature, they are much colder, rational, and detailed than the actual speeches--the political, ideological, and cultural level of the PSDI Central Committee meeting certainly was high. As far as I am concerned, a very large number of the speeches had been written in advance (contrary to what happens in the PSI) and we must observe that none of them appeared to be outside the center of the debate which revolved around the continuation of the lengthy--and sometimes rather diatribal--discussion which has been dividing the Italian socialists since the end of World War I. In other words, from the very moment at which the European worker and socialist movement began the long struggle (which has been terminated in almost all of the rest of Europe but which is still going on in Italy and France), unleashed by the 21 points of the Communist International and whose stakes involved the dramatic choice between gradualism and revolution.

The discourse, which emerged during those speeches, involved the rediscovered ideal unity of the Italian socialist movement around the magic term of "reformism."

But while for the most part these speeches expressed satisfaction over the recognition of the historical validity of the social-democratic-Christian choice of 1947,

not a single one of them contained the slightest triumphalist accent in such terms as "we told you so" or "we said it first." There was rather a hope for the resumption of a discourse on socialist strategy initiated after World War II and immediately consumed by the choices imposed by the division of the world into opposing blocs, by the frontism of the PSI, and by the split of 1947. The long years of division, the choices as to field which had to be made in the past, the ideological prejudices, the suspicions of old ambiguities in the end were overcome by the unanimous judgment according to which the PSI at Palermo irreversibly embarked upon the grand road of democratic socialism by once and for all linking up with the reformist tradition. But we must not conceal the fact that this judgment was based on two tacitly accepted assumptions which however only the passage of time could confirm. The first is that Craxi and his group definitely were able to win control of the party; the second one is that the reformist majority would be an ideologically, culturally, and politically homogeneous whole. Here we must point out however that, around the concept of a "reformist socialism," there can arise, between the PSI and the PSDI, a crude semantic-political misunderstanding which it would be a good idea to spell out through adequate studies and above all through cultural not just political confrontation. If in fact it is true that "reformism" for the democratic socialists is equivalent to the rejection of the revolution-oriented wordage of the other socialist group, which is called "maximalism," and the adoption, without any uncertainty, of the gradualist method which, in the history of the first form of socialism, had the purpose not only of changing society and the state but also man through reforms, then it is just as true that this would be understood in the same fashion by the leadership group of the majority of the PSI and by its militants.

Parties and Reform Socialism

Rome L'UMANITA in Italian 5 Jun 81 p 3

[Article by Gianni Finocchiaro: "The PSDI, the PSI, and Reformist Socialism"]

[Text] In effect, we all know that the term "reformist," adopted by the Craxian majority shortly before the Palermo Congress, is due to an initiative which was not a group initiative but rather an individual initiative by Craxi himself.

And although the current PSI secretary is granted a long and coherent autonomistic position, we must not forget that it had been maintained tenacity, to the point of obstinacy, by the autonomist group in an extremely minority position (12 percent) represented in the directorate by Craxi against the background of the charismatic figure of Nenni. The real risk therefore is that the reformist sincerity of Craxi and the autonomist group might not be paralleled in the PSI by a homogeneous concept of the entire reformist current which emerged victorious at Palermo. As a matter of fact, the reformism that has emerged is not only the reformism of the early socialism, of the gradualism to which reference is being made in the PSDI. To it was added that complex of institutional reform proposals which Craxi, with a good deal of imagination, presented as an indispensable prerequisite for stopping that process of political breakup toward which the Italian democratic system seems to be headed.

The need for a further in-depth development and a verification of the reformist concept of the PSI will be inevitable if we furthermore take into account the fact that, among the members of the Central Committee elected by the Palermo Congress, the nucleus of long-standing autonomists, made up of about 30 comrades who were members of the Central Committee after the split of 1969 and who were confirmed with the same number at the 1972 Genoa Congress, the 1976 Rome Congress, and the 1978 Turin Congress, has now shrunk to 22 members.

To tell the truth, as a comrade observed rather keenly during his address to the Central Committee, the suspicion that "Craxi and his team" won at Palermo, rather than the reformism that is the offspring of socialist autonomism, is anything but unfounded. It is now evident that it will be necessary sooner or later to remove all misunderstandings which might spring up around "reformism" which is understood by one group as a historical-ideological position of socialism and by the other one as a new and immediate political position designed to rally around it all of the proposals for the country's political and institutional "grand reform."

Political Semantics

Here is an aspect which must not be overlooked likewise in order not to make a mistake similar to the one made by a member of the PSDI directorate (I may be permitted to refrain from giving his last name and first name) who, several years after the 1969 split, told me something like this: "In 1966, we social democrats with enthusiasm went into unification with the PSI because we thought that the party was all behind Nenni. We realized only too late that it was not." And this is the difference in semantics between the political remarks by the militant of the PSI and the militant of the PSI [as published], starting from the most modest levels and going up to the highest levels of the Central Committee.

The fact is that, while the former is more receptive to the influence of communist language, which is often distorting and distorted, in the style of the very angry radical-chic, the latter, that is, the social democrat, is very little influenced by outside factors or at least much less so. Hence, we have the presumed modern nature of socialist language and the equally presumed archaic nature of social democratic language.

I am naturally not trying to go into an examination involving sociological, political, and historical aspects; I merely want to say that while one of them has adjusted to the continuous transformation of words and their meanings, as handled on the left, the other one quite firmly sticks to a kind of semantic positivism which can also be swapped for id ological and political immobility.

The truth is that, on the one hand--by virtue of the ideological travels of the communists and, to a certain extent, also those of the socialists, over the past 30 years--there is greater political-cultural mobility and hence also language use, whereas, on the other hand, there is a compact ideological and political homogeneity.

In other words, socialism often is rather full of fantasy in stating its political theses which are built on the grounds of a border-line party which exists in an

environment of permanent political complexity, always halfway between Marxism and modern socialism, between government and opposition, between democratic socialism of the European brand and national specificity, between class party and popular party, between libertarian party and a party with a strong sense of state, between a European party and a European-Mediterranean party, at its elbow always the PCI, which every day invents a nonexistent third way. The social democrats on the other hand appear to be standing on a position which is backed up by a definitive choice that does not require any semantic enrichment or contortions by way of justification for further development. We might say that it remains tied to choices of irreversible concepts against the background of a well-defined ideology. If we want to introduce an illuminating simplification, it suffices to look at what the term "democracy" means to a social democrat, beyond the concept based on the binomial of liberty and equality, deriving from the liberal-democratic concept that emerged from the French Revolution, and, on the other hand, what the same concept means to a socialist, when it is artificially filled--in the wake of communist semantics--with "participation," "progressivism," "advancement," and so forth and so on.

Participation and Style

The other aspect which appeared to me to be of extraordinary interest involves the broad participation of women in the debate (20 percent of the speeches). Although it is true that, during this Central Committee meeting, the second argument directly touched on women's interests through the imminent referendum vote against the repeal of the abortion law, it is just as true that all of the remarks by the women were not confined only to that issue. Instead, throughout the entire political debate, they took up the new relationships with the PSI, displaying serious and concrete political awareness which was neither marginal, nor repetitive. The primacy of the PSDI over all of the Italian parties in terms of reserving 15 percent of the Central Committee seats to the female component (although this is not equally implemented in the party directorate) retains its full and great value since women in Italian society and especially in political life are still largely kept out and disregarded as a result of Catholic-style masculinism.

The participation of the middle-level cadres in the debate, that is to say, Central Committee members who do not belong to the directorate or to parliament, was also proportionally much broader (16 speeches out of a total of 35) than one usually encounters in the meetings of the PSI Central Committee where the debate often boils down to a continuation of whatever was started in the directorate or to public declarations by its principal members, released to the press, especially the daily press, so that the initial position statements are presented each time. If I were to use a strong word, I would refer to this kind of debate as a "hullabaloo debate" in which prevail the language, the double meanings, and the distracting indications to which all of the other members of the Central Committee can then subscribe.

In substance, comparing the two debates, again regarding the middle-level cadres, the socialist debate is based on two reports--the report of the most important members of the directorate and the reports from, let us say, the rank and file--while the social democratic debate instead revolves around a single report, based either on ideological compactness or on the common platform, on which the discussion is developed.

In conclusion, I might be permitted to introduce one last positive aspect which I spotted and which to me personally does not seem to be of secondary importance. This is the fact that, during the debate, the party secretary was always present, listening to all the speeches together with the vice secretaries who directed the activities as such. I am not even talking about the gesture of warm courtesy by Pietro Longo in extending his hand to every speaker at the end of his remarks. But the fact of mentioning, with last name and first name, and with approval, dissent, or correction, the speeches of numerous Central Committee members in reply, seemed to me to be a form of extraordinary political seriousness and respect which I would like to cite as a model for the comrade members of the PSI Central Committee who, alas, often speak for the minutes to be published in AVANTI!, addressing a half-empty room and a Central Committee chair that is often absent, including the party secretary. I do not know whether this is only a question of style or operating procedure. I will encounter this again during the next meetings of the Central Committee and I want to take this opportunity to thank the committee for having been kind enough to listen to me in a brotherly fashion. But if this is its style and operating procedure, then I must admit that, in the PSDI, in addition to that political and ideological homogeneity which I mentioned earlier, there is still a brotherhood of human relations and a political respect which testify to the inalienability of a tradition which for always remains the most precious heritage of the Italian socialist movement.

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ANALYSIS OF NEW PSI CENTRAL COMMITTEE

Rome L'ESPRESSO in Italian 17 May 81 pp 13-14

[Article by Francesco de Vito: "Analysis of New PSI Central Committee"]

> [Text] In the first team we have the Formica people, in the second one the Marselli followers, and in the third one the Lagorio group.

Rome. An accurate x-ray of the new PSI Central Committee will help us understand why Bettino Craxi preferred to have himself elected directly by the congress. Out of the 201 members which the reformist majority has in the Central Committee, only a small patrol, as it were, comes from the ranks of the autonomists and has the prescribed full degree of Craxian pedigree. The rest is washed up on the shores of the reformist current after having gone through all of the other currents of the party, from the Martini current to the Mancini current and on to the Lombardi current.

But there is more. In the reformist archipelago, Craxi blindly trusts only 86 members of the Central Committee whose political record classifies them as his most faithful followers or his lieutenants Rino Formica, Claudio Martelli, and Lelio Lagorio. Among those 86, the largest group (34 members) follows Formica and his two deacons Giorgio Gangi and Giuseppe La Ganga. Martelli likewise has a little group of his own consisting of 23 members of the Central Committee, also including the Roman group of Paris Dell'Unto. Lagorio on the other hand has the smallest group (four) and is present only in Tuscany, his home region. These three groups are united by undisputed loyalty to the boss who represents the point of greatest force for each of the lieutenants. For them he diversifies the latent conflict aimed at winning a bigger slice of internal power. Besides, anybody who decides to stick with Formica does so because he does not support Martelli; anybody who picks Martelli, does so because he considers himself to be a long-standing adversary of Formica. Then we have the 25 members who are dominated directly by Craxi and that gives us the total of 86.

Next comes another grouping, the biggest one, represented by those who can be called generic Craxians, and there are 53 of them. They are generally drawn from the De Martini and Mancini sections and they are included in the local groups which are often openly at war with each other. The ex-Giolittians--and there are eight of

them--can also be considered generic Craxians and they are a group that breaks up and is reconstituted depending upon the situation.

Among the groups which--within the reformist majority--retain a more marked political profile or a more specific regional tradition, the biggest one is the group of Minister Gianni De Michelis; that group consists of 30 Central Committee members and is scattered almost throughout all of national territory, with a strong base in Veneto. Minister Enrico Manca, who has avoided describing himself as too much of a member of the autonomous group ever since he joined the majority, has a following of nine Central Committee members, mostly distributed in Umbria. Salvatore Lauricella retains control over western Sicily with ten Central Committee members and prevails over minister Nicola Capria who has five members from eastern Sicily behind him.

Following the direct election of the secretary, this subdivision into groups and subgroups does not worry Craxi much any longer. Only a congress can remove him. Diversification however must be kept in mind in case a transfer to Chigi Palace should sooner or later raise the problem of appointing another secretary. A direct dynastic succession from Craxi to Formica, who has been appointed vice secretary, has not been ruled out. In that case, Martelli and De Michelis will have their say, together with the others. In the list, below, the members of the various reformist groupings are given by name.

Regarding the minority groups, the analysis of the Central Committee shows us that the struggle for hegemony in the Lombardian left ended with the confirmation of Claudio Signorile's leadership. He has a following of 44 members of the left out of 61, also including the teams of Nerio Nesi and Gigi Covatta, against nine of Fabrizio Cicchitto. Another eight are to be considered autonomous Lombardians.

In the "new left," finally, 16 Central Committee members follow Michele Achilli while eight follow Francesco De Martino.

'Who's Who' Among the Good Guys

Here, arranged by groups, are the members of the reformist majority in the new PSI Central Committee.

Craxi-Formica-Gangi-La Ganga Group: Abbondanza, Artioli, Babbini, Biffi-Gentile, Boselli, Bozzello, Canepa, Carella, Ciavarella, Ferrarini, Mainolfi, Masciadri, Marinucci, Mautarelli, Monsellato, Musca, Musso, Passaro, Pavoni, Quaranta, Rais, Santini, Scaglione, Scamarcio, Seppia, Sollazzo, Tessore, Testa, Toschi, Zaccaria.

Craxi-Martelli Group: Badini, Bertazzoni, Boniver, Cassola, Cernetti, De Carli, De Domenico, Dell'Unto, Enrietti, Gentile, Giacci, Guerra, Novellini, Bruno Pellegrino, Poti, Re David, Scanni, Sodano, Tocci, Vidali, Zanella, Zavoli.

Craxi-Lagorio Group: Bennelli, Colzi, Sicca.

Long-Standing Autonomists or Faithful Followers of the Secretary: Baldani-Guerra, Bartolini, Burnacci, Campi, Del Bue, Finetti, Forte, Fortuna, Intini, Moretti, Nastasi, Giuliana Nenni, Pillitteri, Pini, Portoghesi, Scalfati, Scarso (Daniela

Scarso, secretary to Craxi), Signori, Solla, Strazzi, Tamburrano, Tognoli, Vassalli, Zagari, Zito.

Generic Craxians: Alberini, Ando, Aniasi, Arfe, Baldini, Balzamo, Bartocci, Callegaris, Casalinuovo, Colucci, Conte, Di Vagno, Fincato, Fossa, Frasca, Giulianati, Labriola, Angelo Landi, Lazzarini, Libertino, Liccardi, Livieri, Lucarelli, Magenta, Manieri, Manchinu, Gaetano Mancini, Marango, Mariotti, Mazzanotte, Mundo, Neri, Olivo, Palleschi, Parini, Pedrazzoli, Principe, Ravenna, Rigo, Santarelli, Schemmari, Simonelli, Tacconi, Tarricone, Teardo, Tiraboschi, Tocco, Trappoli, Vella, Vertemati, Vittorelli, Zarro, Strehler.

Ex-Giolittians: Amato, Chiappini, Coen, Giugni, Federico Mancini, Meoli, Vineis.

De Michelis Group: Acquaviva, Armentani, Bravo, Breda, Capacci, Caldoro, Daffara, Delfino, Della Croce, Cesare De Michelis, Brunetti, Laroni, Claudio Lenoci, Simonetta Lenoci, Magnani Noya, Mammoliti, Marzo, Monesi, Piro, Pittella, Rolando, Sacconi, Saladino, Salerno, Saluzzo, Severi, Spano, Susi, Zagolin.

Lauricella Group: Enza Barilla, Giovanni Barilla, Castiglia, Cusumano, Granata, Mazzaglia, Pizzo, Placenti, Reina.

Capria Group: Amodeo, De Marco, Fiorino, Bartolo Pellegrino.

Manca Group: Barbaresi, Cacace, Dellini, Cona, Fatale, Galeazzi, Giannotta, Tempestini.

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NORDIC NUCLEAR-WEAPONS FREE ZONE IS ELECTION ISSUE

Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 23-24 May 81 p 3

[Article by Ole Kromann: "Nuclear-Free Zone in the North Central Theme in Norwegian Election Campaign."]

[Text] The "No to Nuclear Weapons" organization has initiated an inquiry into the question.

Oslo, May--A clear position on the question of a zone in the North free of nuclear weapons will be demanded of all candidates in the 14 September Storting elections.

An organization, "No to Nuclear Weapons," which includes both adherents and opponents of NATO, is behind the inquiry. The problem was a main theme during the first duel on television between the two major opponents in the election: Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland of the Labor Party and Kare Willoch, parliamentarian leader of the Conservatives and prime minister candidate.

This week, the two will meet against Eidsvold, the Mecca of Norwegian parliamentarianism, where on 17 May 1814, the four hundred-year-old union of Denmark-Norway came to an end.

This is taking place at just the time when Norway's attitude toward nuclear armament, the new nuclear weapons, and its relations with the United States under the Reagan administration and with NATO are the central themes in public debate, and when Gro Harlem Brundtland is getting ready for her first official visit to Finland as prime minister. To the great irritation of changing Norwegian governments, President Kekkonen of Finland has repeatedly raised the proposal of a zone in the North free of nuclear weapons.

The Prime Minister's office confirms that Gro Harlem Brundtland will discuss security policy subjects with both the Finnish prime minister and the president.

The Norwegian Labor Party and the National Federation of Labor Unions have at their congresses adopted an attitude toward Kekkonen's proposal which with certain reservations conform to the Finnish proposal.

The program adopted by the Labor Party speaks of "a zone free of nuclear weapons in the North as a part of the effort to de-escalate nuclear weapons in a larger European context." At a much commented upon speech recently in a meeting of

the Oslo Labor Party Reiulf Steen, former minister of trade and chairman of the Labor Party until the congress, interpreted this to the effect that the Nordic countries could take the lead in declaring themselves free of nuclear weapons at the time of a crisis or critical situation, given guarantees from the two superpowers and certain concessions by the Soviet Union concerning the tactical nuclear weapons programmed for the Nordic area.

"Norway cannot isolate itself from Europe," Steen said, "But this does not mean that a Nordic zone depends upon or must come at the same time as steps taken applying to all of Europe." The Conservatives criticize the Nordic social democrats for weakening Norwegian and Danish security with their initiative. To this Steen replies that NATO membership does not prevent Norway from taking the initiative, together with its Nordic neighbors, to promote peace and relaxation of tensions in this part of the world.

Reiulf Steen, who, as vice-chairman of the Socialist International, just returned home from Nicaragua, Bolivia (where he met secretly with partisan leaders), and Cuba, is married to the vice-minister of justice in the former Allende government. She accompanied him to Latin America as his interpreter.

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EDITORIAL COMMENTS ON TURKISH INCIDENTS

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 27 May 81 p 7

/Text/ There is no reason to dramatize the recent Turkish provocative action at our country's expense. This one too will be added to the series of Ankara's deliberate provocative actions against Greece, actions which were initiated last April and have since been continued in an escalated way with retrogressions which are not accidental but constitute part of an overall Turkish tactic which no doubt has a purpose. We say that there is no reason to dramatize the last Turkish provocative action not because it is not serious and unacceptable per se but because it is part of an already known Turkish policy and because this whole tactic is not about to surpass, for the moment at least, that point beyond which it would have positive consequences...

As concerns the substance of the whole issue, there emerge two questions: What does Ankara expect and hope from this tactic of chain provocations and by rotating tensions and detente in its relations with Greece? Has Ankara undertaken at its own initiative this policy which it keeps carrying on, ignoring those powerful factors in the international arena on which it depends completely or has it secured their toleration (at least)?

These two questions are interlinked and for the sake of greater clarity we shall attempt to answer each question separately.

The first and evident fact which emerges strikingly from the provocations of the last 2 months is that Turkey's designs on the Hellenic space (Greece and Cyprus) remain unalterable. As we have repeatedly pointed out, these designs constitute an organic part of Turkey's firm aspirations and "national objectives" beyond and independently of manipulations by persons in the various governments or by the managers of power in Ankara. /These designs/ are a function of a total correlation of forces and of an entire network of factors--both objective and subjective--since 1974 and hence.

This network includes the attitude of the powerful factors in the international arena both in the east and west--factors to which we alluded above and on which Turkey depends in a position or negative way. As long as this correlation and this network continues unaltered the Turkish designs will persist. Why the present policy of chain provocations and tension escalations? It seems that Turkey's objective is to test Greece's strength and determination in defending those of its

sovereign rights which Turkey questions--especially the limits of the Greek air space--but also to test the overall firmness of our country against the Turkish factor.

In this respect, the dispatch was particularly characteristic--as an example and as a way of sounding out--of a Turkish press agency about a Turkish move to have the Greek islands of the eastern Aegean demilitarized, which (dispatch) Ankara took care to deny after it found out that it did not work. The test ended in failure for its contrivers. Yet--and this leads us to the second question--it is doubtful that Turkey would dare undertake an escalation of the tension in its relations with Greece--a marginal form of which would be a catalytic crisis in the southeastern wing of the Atlantic Alliance--without the acquiescence or at least the toleration of those powerful factors in the international arena on whom Turkey depends and who consider it--or intend it to be--their preeminent "arm" in the area of the Middle East and central-western Asia. This view which makes as much sense as the first--even though indirect--sounding out (which was tantamount to a suggestion) about the demilitarization of the eastern Aegean islands, was reported by an American journalist who is known for his connections in "high places."

But "there is good in everything bad." The last crisis has proved how justified Greece's persistence is in maintaining the balance of power in the Aegean and giving priority to the threat from "the East" despite the consistent and sometimes hot tempered, contrary suggestions and recommendations of some implacable friends...

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